by Adam Hartung | Apr 15, 2016 | Defend & Extend, In the Whirlpool, Lifecycle, Web/Tech
Leading tech tracking companies IDC and Gartner both announced Q1, 2016 PC sales results, and they were horrible. Sales were down 9.5%-11.5% depending on which tracker you asked. And that’s after a horrible Q4, 2015 when sales were off more than 10%. PC sales have now declined for 6 straight quarters, and sales are roughly where they were in 2007, 9 years ago.
Oh yeah, that was when the iPhone launched – June, 2007. And just a couple of years before the iPad launched. Correlation, or causation?
Amazingly, when Q4 ended the forecasters were still optimistic of a stabilization and turnaround in PC sales. Typical analyst verbage was like this from IDC, “Commercial adoption of Windows 10 is expected to accelerate, and consumer buying should also stabilize by the second half of the year. Most PC users have delayed an upgrade, but can only maintain this for so long before facing security and performance issues.” And just to prove that hope springs eternal from the analyst breast, here is IDC’s forecast for 2016 after the horrible Q1, “In the short term, the PC market must still grapple with limited consumer interest and competition from other infrastructure upgrades in the commercial market. Nevertheless….things should start picking up in terms of Windows 10 pilots turning into actual PC purchases.”
Fascinating. Once again, the upturn is just around the corner. People have always looked forward to upgrading their PCs, there has always been a “PC upgrade cycle” and one will again emerge. Someday. At least, the analysts hope so. Maybe?
Microsoft investors must hope so. The company is selling at a price/earnings multiple of 40 on hopes that Windows 10 sales will soon boom, and re-energize PC growth. Surely. Hopefully. Maybe?
The world has shifted, and far too many people don’t like to recognize the shift. When Windows 8 launched it was clear that interest in PC software was diminishing. What was once a major front page event, a Windows upgrade, was unimportant. By the time Windows 10 came along there was so little interest that its launch barely made any news at all. This market, these products, are really no longer relevant to the growth of personal technology.
Back when I predicted that Windows 8 would be a flop I was inundated with hate mail. It was clear that Ballmer was a terrible CEO, and would soon be replaced by the board. Same when I predicted that Surface tablets would not sell well, and that all Windows devices would not achieve significant share. People called me “an Apple Fanboy” or a “Microsoft hater.” Actually, neither was true. It was just clear that a major market shift was happening in computing. The world was rapidly going mobile, and cloud-based, and the PC just wasn’t going to be relevant. As the PC lost relevancy, so too would Microsoft because it completely missed the market, and its entries were far too tied to old ways of thinking about personal and corporate computing – not to mention the big lead competitors had in devices, apps and cloud services.
I’ve never said that modern PCs are bad products. I have a son half way through a PhD in Neurobiological Engineering. He builds all kinds of brain models and 3 dimensional brain images and cell structure plots — and he does all kinds of very exotic math. His world is built on incredibly powerful, fast PCs. He loves Windows 10, and he loves PCs — and he really “doesn’t get” tablets. And I truly understand why. His work requires local computational power and storage, and he loves Windows 10 over all other platforms.
But he is not a trend. His deep understanding of the benefits of Windows 10, and some of the PC manufacturers as well as those who sell upgrade componentry, is very much a niche. While he depends heavily on Microsoft and Wintel manufacturers to do his work, he is a niche user. (BTW he uses a Nexus phone and absolutely loves it, as well. And he can wax eloquently about the advantages he achieves by using an Android device.)
Today, I doubt I will receive hardly any comments to this column. Because to most people, the PC is nearly irrelevant. People don’t actually care about PC sales results, or forecasts. Not nearly as much as, say, care about whether or not the iPhone 6se advances the mobile phone market in a meaningful way.
Most people do their work, almost if not all their work, on a mobile device. They depend on cloud and SaaS (software-as-a-service) providers and get a lot done on apps. What they can’t do on a phone, they do on a tablet, by and large. They may, or may not, use a PC of some kind (Mac included in that reference) but it is not terribly important to them. PCs are now truly generic, like a refrigerator, and if they need one they don’t much care who made it or anything else – they just want it to do whatever task they have yet to migrate to their mobile world.
The amazing thing is not that PC sales have fallen for 6 quarters. That was easy to predict back in 2013. The amazing thing is that some people still don’t want to accept that this trend will never reverse. And many people, even though they haven’t carried around a laptop for months (years?) and don’t use a Windows mobile device, still think Microsoft is a market leader, and has a great future. PCs, and for the most part Microsoft, are simply no more relevant than Sears, Blackberry, or the Encyclopedia Britannica. Yet it is somewhat startling that some people have failed to think about the impact this has on their company, companies that make PC software and hardware – and the impact this will have on their lives – and likely their portfolios.
by Adam Hartung | Apr 1, 2014 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Swamp, Leadership, Web/Tech
“Hope springs eternal in the human breast” (Alexander Pope)
As it does for most investors. People do not like to accept the notion that a business will lose relevancy, and its value will fall. Especially really big companies that are household brand names. Investors, like customers, prefer to think large, established companies will continue to be around, and even do well. It makes everyone feel better to have a optimistic attitude about large, entrenched organizations.
And with such optimism investors have cheered Microsoft for the last 15 months. After a decade of trading up and down around $26/share, Microsoft stock has made a significant upward move to $41 – a new decade-long high. This price has people excited Microsoft will reach the dot.com/internet boom high of $60 in 2000.
After discovering that Windows 8, and the Surface tablet, were nowhere near reaching sales expectations after Christmas 2012 – and that PC sales were declining faster than expected – investors were cheered in 2013 to hear that CEO Steve Ballmer would resign. After much speculation, insider Satya Nadella was named CEO, and he quickly made it clear he was refocusing the company on mobile and cloud. This started the analysts, and investors, on their recent optimistic bent.
CEO Nadella has cut the price of Windows by 70% in order to keep hardware manufacturers on Windows for lower cost machines, and he announced the company’s #1 sales and profit product – Office – was being released on iOS for iPad users. Investors are happy to see this action, as they hope that it will keep PC sales humming. Or at least slow the decline in sales while keeping manufacturers (like HP) in the Microsoft Windows fold. And investors are likewise hopeful that the long awaited Office announcement will mean booming sales of Office 365 for all those Apple products in the installed base.
But, there’s a lot more needed for Microsoft to succeed than these announcements. While Microsoft is the world’s #1 software company, it is still under considerable threat and its long-term viability remains unsure.
Windows is in a tough spot. After this price decline, Microsoft will need to increase sales volume by 2.5X to recoup lost profits. Meanwhile, Chrome laptops are considerably cheaper for customers and more profitable for manufacturers. And whether this price cut will have any impact on the decline in PC sales is unclear, as users are switching to mobile products for ease-of-use reasons that go far beyond price. Microsoft has taken an action to defend and extend its installed base of manufacturers who have been threatening to move, but the impact on profits is still likely to be negative and PC sales are still going to decline.
Meanwhile, the move to offer Office on iOS is clearly another offer to defend the installed Office marketplace, and unlikely to create a lot of incremental revenue and profit growth. The PC market has long been much bigger than tablets, and almost every PC had Office installed. Shrinking at 12-14% means a lot less Windows Office is being sold. And, In tablets iOS is not 100% of the market, as Android has substantial share. Offering Office on iOS reaches a lot of potential machines, but certainly not 100% as has been the case with PCs.
Further, while there are folks who look forward to running Office on an iOS device, Office is not without competition. Both Apple and Google offer competitive products to Office, and the price is free. For price sensitive users, both individuals and corporations, after 4 years of using competitive products it is by no means a given they all are ready to pay $60-$100 per device per year. Yes, there will be Office sales Microsoft did not previously have, but whether it will be large enough to cover the declining sales of Office on the PC is far from clear. And whether current pricing is viable is far, far from certain.
While these Microsoft products are the easiest for consumers to understand, Nadella’s move to make Microsoft successful in the mobile/cloud world requires succeeding with cloud products sold to corporations and software-as-service providers. Here Microsoft is late, and facing substantial competition as well.
Just last week Google cut the price of its Compute Engine cloud infrastructure (IaaS) platform and App Engine cloud app platform (PaaS) products 30-32%. Google cut the price of its Cloud Storage and BigQuery (big data analytics) services by 68% and 85% as it competes headlong for customers with Amazon. Amazon, which has the first-mover position and large customers including the U.S. federal government, cut prices within 24 hours for its EC2 cloud computing service by 30%, and for its S3 storage service by over 50%. Amazon also reduced prices on its RDS database service approximately 28%, and its Elasticache caching service by over 33%.
To remain competitive, Microsoft had to react this week by chopping prices on its Azure cloud computing products 27%-35%, reducing cloud storage pricing 44%-65%, and whacking prices on its Windows and Linux memory-intensive computing products 27%-35%. While these products have allowed the networking division formerly run by now CEO Nadella to be profitable, it will be increasingly difficult to maintain old profit levels on existing customers, and even a tougher problem to profitably steal share from the early cloud leaders – even as the market grows.
While optimism has grown for Microsoft fans, and the share price has moved distinctly higher, it is smart to look at other market leaders who obtained investor favorability, only to quickly lose it.
Blackberry was known as RIM (Research in Motion) in June, 2007 when the iPhone was launched. RIM was the market leader, a near monopoly in smart phones, and its stock was riding high at $70. In August, 2007, on the back of its dominant status, the stock split – and moved on to a split adjusted $140 by end of 2008. But by 2010, as competition with iOS and Android took its toll RIM was back to $80 (and below.) Today the rechristened company trades for $8.
Sears was once the country’s largest and most successful retailer. By 2004 much of the luster was coming off when KMart purchased the company and took its name, trading at only $20/share. Following great enthusiasm for a new CEO (Ed Lampert) investors flocked to the stock, sure it would take advantage of historical brands such as DieHard, Kenmore and Craftsman, plus leverage its substantial real estate asset base. By 2007 the stock had risen to $180 (a 9x gain.) But competition was taking its toll on Sears, despite its great legacy, and sales/store started to decline, total sales started declining and profits turned to losses which began to stretch into 20 straight quarters of negative numbers. Meanwhile, demand for retail space declined, and prices declined, cutting the value of those historical assets. By 2009 the stock had dropped back to $40, and still trades around that value today — as some wonder if Sears can avoid bankruptcy.
Best Buy was a tremendous success in its early years, grew quickly and built a loyal customer base as the #1 retail electronics purveyor. But streaming video and music decimated CD and DVD sales. On-line retailers took a huge bite out of consumer electronic sales. By January, 2013 the stock traded at $13. A change of CEO, and promises of new formats and store revitalization propped up optimism amongst investors and by November, 2014 the stock was at $44. However, market trends – which had been in place for several years – did not change and as store sales lagged the stock dropped, today trading at only $25.
Microsoft has a great legacy. It’s products were market leaders. But the market has shifted – substantially. So far new management has only shown incremental efforts to defend its historical business with product extensions – which are up against tremendous competition that in these new markets have a tremendous lead. Microsoft so far is still losing money in on-line and gaming (xBox) where it has lost almost all its top leadership since 2014 began and has been forced to re-organize. Nadella has yet to show any new products that will create new markets in order to “turn the tide” of sales and profits that are under threat of eventual extinction by ever-more-capable mobile products.
While optimism springs eternal long-term investors would be smart to be skeptical about this recent improvement in the stock price. Things could easily go from mediocre to worse in these extremely competitive global tech markets, leaving Microsoft optimists with broken dreams, broken hearts and broken portfolios.
Update: On April 2 Microsoft announced it is providing Windows for free to all manufacturers with a 9″ or smaller display. This is an action to help keep Microsoft competitive in the mobile marketplace – but it does little for Microsoft profitability. Android from Google may be free, but Google’s business is built on ad sales – not software sales – and that’s dramatically different from Microsoft that relies almost entirely on Windows and Office for its profitability
Update: April 3 CRN (Computer Reseller News) reviewed Office products for iOS – “We predict that once the novelty of “Office for iPad” wears off, companies will go back to relying on the humble, hard-working third parties building apps that are as stable, as handsome and far more capable than those of Redmond. It’s not that hard to do.”
by Adam Hartung | Oct 4, 2012 | Defend & Extend, In the Whirlpool, Leadership, Lifecycle, Web/Tech
If you're still an investor in Hewlett Packard you must be new to this blog. But for those who remain optimistic, it is worth reveiwing why Ms. Whitman's forecast for HP yesterday won't happen. There are sound reasons why the company has lost 35% of its value since she took over as CEO, over 75% since just 2010 – and over $90B of value from its peak.
HP was dying before Whitman arrived
I recall my father pointing to a large elm tree when I was a boy and saying "that tree will be dead in under 2 years, we might as well cut it down now." "But it's huge, and has leaves" I said. "It doesn't look dead." "It's not dead yet, but the environmental wind damage has cost it too many branches, the changing creek direction created standing water rotting its roots, and neighboring trees have grown taking away its sunshine. That tree simply won't survive. I know it's more than 3 stories tall, with a giant trunk, and you can't tell it now – but it is already dead."
To teach me the lesson, he decided not to cut the tree. And the following spring it barely leafed out. By fall, it was clearly losing bark, and well into demise. We cut it for firewood.
Such is the situation at HP. Before she became CEO (but while she was a Director – so she doesn't escape culpability for the situation) previous leaders made bad decisions that pushed HP in the wrong direction:
- Carly Fiorina, alone, probably killed HP with the single decision to buy Compaq and gut the HP R&D budget to implement a cost-based, generic strategy for competing in Windows-based PCs. She sucked most of the money out of the wildly profitable printer business to subsidize the transition, and destroy any long-term HP value.
- Mark Hurd furthered this disaster by further investing in cost-cutting to promote "scale efficiencies" and price reductions in PCs. Instead of converting software products and data centers into profitable support products for clients shifting to software-as-a-service (SAAS) or cloud services he closed them – to "focus" on the stagnating, profit-eroding PC business.
- His ill-conceived notion of buying EDS to compete in traditional IT services long after the market had demonstrated a major shift offshore, and declining margins, created an $8B write-off last year; almost 60% of the purchase price. Giving HP another big, uncompetitive business unit in a lousy market.
- His purchase of Palm for $1.2B was a ridiculous price for a business that was once an early leader, but had nothing left to offer customers (sort of like RIM today.) HP used Palm to bring out a Touchpad tablet, but it was so late and lacking apps that the product was recalled from retailers after only 49 days. Another write-off.
- Leo Apotheker bought a small Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) software company – only more than a decade after monster competitors Oracle, SAP and IBM had encircled the market. Further, customers are now looking past ERP for alternatives to the inflexible "enterprise apps" which hinder their ability to adjust quickly in today's rapidly changing marektplace. The ERP business is sure to shrink, not grow.
Whitman's "Turnaround Plan" simply won't work
Meg is projecting a classic "hockey stick" performance. She plans for revenues and profits to decline for another year or two, then magically start growing again in 3 years. There's a reason "hockey stick" projections don't happen. They imply the company is going to get a lot better, and competitors won't. And that's not how the world works.
Let's see, what will likely happen over the next 3 years from technology advances by industry leaders Apple, Android and others? They aren't standing still, and there's no reason to believe HP will suddenly develop some fantastic mojo to become a new product innovator, leapfrogging them for new markets.
- Meg's first action is cost cutting – to "fix" HP. Cutting 29,000 additional jobs won't fix anything. It just eliminates a bunch of potentially good idea generators who would like to grow the company. When Meg says this is sure to reduce the number of products, revenues and profits in 2013 we can believe that projection fully.
- Adding features like scanning and copying to printers will make no difference to sales. The proliferation of smart devices increasingly means people don't print. Just like we don't carry newspapers or magazines, we don't want to carry memos or presentations. The world is going digital (duh) and printing demand is not going to grow as we read things on smartphones and tablets instead of paper.
- HP is not going to chase the smartphone business. Although it is growing rapidly. Given how late HP is to market, this is probably not a bad idea. But it begs the question of how HP plans to grow.
- HP is going not going to exit PCs. Too bad. Maybe Lenovo or Dell would pay up for this dying business. Holding onto it will do HP no good, costing even more money when HP tries to remain competitive as sales fall and margins evaporate due to overcapacity leading to price wars.
- HP will launch a Windows8 tablet in January targeted at "enterprises." Given the success of the iPad, Samsung Galaxy and Amazon Kindle products exactly how HP will differentiate for enterprise success is far from clear. And entering the market so late, with an unproven operating system platform is betting the market on Microsoft making it a success. That is far, far from a low-risk bet. We could well see this new tablet about as successful as the ill-fated Touchpad.
- Ms. Whitman is betting HP's future (remember, 3 years from now) on "cloud" computing. Oh boy. That is sort of like when WalMart told us their future growth would be "China." She did not describe what HP was going to do differently, or far superior, to unseat companies already providing a raft of successful, growing, profitable cloud services. "Cloud" is not an untapped market, with companies like Oracle, IBM, VMWare, Salesforce.com, NetApp and EMC (not to mention Apple and Amazon) already well entrenched, investing heavily, launching new products and gathering customers.
HPs problems are far deeper than who is CEO
Ms. Whitman said that the biggest problem at HP has been executive turnover. That is not quite right. The problem is HP has had a string of really TERRIBLE CEOs that have moved the company in the wrong direction, invested horribly in outdated strategies, ignored market shifts and assumed that size alone would keep HP successful. In a bygone era all of them – from Carly Fiorina to Mark Hurd to Leo Apotheker – would have been flogged in the Palo Alto public center then placed in stocks so employees (former and current) could hurl fruit and vegetables, or shout obscenities, at them!
Unfortately, Ms. Whitman is sure to join this ignominious list. Her hockey stick projection will not occur; cannot given her strategy.
HP's only hope is to sell the PC business, radically de-invest in printers and move rapidly into entirely new markets. Like Steve Jobs did a dozen years ago when he cut Mac spending to invest in mobile technologies and transform Apple. Meg's faith in operational improvement, commitment to existing "enterprise" markets and Microsoft technology assures HP, and its investors, a decidedly unpleasant future.
by Adam Hartung | May 12, 2012 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Swamp, In the Whirlpool, Leadership, Web/Tech
This has been quite the week for CEO mistakes. First was all the hubbub about Scott Thompson, CEO of Yahoo, inflating his resume to include a computer science degree he did not actually receive. According to Mr. Thompson someone at a recruiting firm added that degree claim in 2005, he didn't know it and he's never read his bio since. A simple oversight, if you can believe he hasn't once read his bio in 7 years, and he didn't think it was ever important to correct someone who introduced him or mentioned it. OOPS – the easy answer for someone making several million dollars per year, and trying to guide a very troubled company from the brink of failure. Hopefully he is more persistent about checking company facts.
But luckily for him, his errors were trumped on Thursday when Jamie Dimon, CEO of J.P.MorganChase notified the world that the bank's hedging operation messed up and lost $2B!! OOPS! According to Mr. Dimon this is really no big deal. Which reminded me of the apocryphal Senator Everett Dirksen statement "a billion here, a billion there and pretty soon it all adds up to real money!"
Interesting "little" mistake from a guy who paid himself some $50M a few years ago, and benefitted greatly from the government TARP program. He said this would be "fodder for pundits," as if we all should simply overlook losing $2B? He also said this was "unfortunate timing." As if there's a good time to lose $2B?
But neither of these problems will likely result in the CEOs losing their jobs. As obviously damaging as both mistakes are, which would naturally have caused us mere employees to instantly lose our jobs – and potentially be prosecuted – CEOs are a rare breed who are allowed wide lattitude in their behavior. These are "one off" events that gain a lot of attention, but the media will have forgotten within a few days, and everyone else within a few months.
By comparison, there are at least 5 CEOs that make these 2 mistakes appear pretty small. For these 5, frequently honored for their position, control of resources and personal wealth, they are doing horrific damage to their companies, hurting investors, employees, suppliers and the communities that rely on their organizations. They should have been fired long before this week.
#5 – John Chambers, Cisco Systems. Mr. Chambers is the longest serving CEO on this list, having led Cisco since 1995 and championed much of its rapid growth as corporations around the world began installing networks. Cisco's stock reached $70/share in 2001. But since then a combination of recessions that cut corporate IT budgets and a market shift to cloud computing has left Cisco scrambling for a strategy, and growth.
Mr. Chambers appears to have been great at operating Cisco as long as he was in a growth market. But since customers turned to cloud computing and greater use of mobile telephony networks Cisco has been unable to innovate, launch and grow new markets for cloud storage, services or applications. Mr. Chambers has reorganized the company 3 times – but it has been much like rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic. Lots of confusion, but no improvement in results.
Between 2001 and 2007 the stock lost half its value, falling to $35. Continuing its slide, since 2007 the stock has halved again, now trading around $17. And there is no sign of new life for Cisco – as each earnings call reinforces a company lacking a strategy in a shifting market. If ever there was a need for replacing a stayed-in-the-job too long CEO it would be Cisco.
#4 – Jeffrey Immelt, General Electric (GE). GE has only had 9 CEOs in its 100+ year life. But this last one has been a doozy. After more than a decade of rapid growth in revenue, profits and valuation under the disruptive "neutron" Jack Welch, GE stock reached $60 in 2000. Which turns out to have been the peak, as GE's value has gone nowhere but down since Mr. Immelt took the top job.
GE was once known for entering and changing markets, unafraid to disrupt how the market performed with innovation in products, supply chain and operations. There was no market too distant, or too locked-in for GE to not find a way to change to its advantage – and profit. But what was the last market we saw GE develop? What has Mr. Immelt, in his decade at the top of GE, done to keep GE as one of the world's most innovative, high growth companies? He has steered the ship away from trouble, but it's only gone in circles as it's used up fuel.
From that high in 2001, GE fell to a low of $8 in 2009 as the financial crisis revealed that under Mr. Immelt GE had largely transitioned from a manufacturing and products company into a financial house. He had taken what was then the easy road to managing money, rather than managing a products and services company. Saved from bankruptcy by a lucrative Berkshire Hathaway, GE lived on. But it's stock is still only $19, down 2/3 from when Mr. Immelt took the CEO position.
"Stewardship" is insufficient leadership in 2012. Today markets shift rapidly, incur intensive global competition and require constant innovation. Mr. Immelt has no vision to propel GE's growth, and should have been gone by 2010, rather than allowed to muddle along with middling performance.
#3 – Mike Duke, WalMart. Mr. Duke has been CEO since 2009, but prior to that he was head of WalMart International. We now know Mr. Duke's business unit saw no problems with bribing foreign officials to grow its business. Just on the basis of knowing about illegal activity, not doing anything about it (and probably condoning and recommending more,) and then trying to change U.S. law to diminish the legal repurcussions, Mr. Duke should have long ago been fired.
It's clear that internally the company and its Board new Mr. Duke was willing to do anything to try and grow WalMart, even if unethical and potentially illegal. Recollections of Enron's Jeff Skilling, Worldcom's Bernie Ebbers and Hollinger's Conrdad Black should be in our heads. How far do we allow leaders to go before holding them accountable?
But worse, not even bribes will save WalMart as Mr. Duke follows a worn-out strategy unfit for competition in 2012. The entire retail market is shifting, with much lower cost on-line companies offering more selection at lower prices. And increasingly these companies are pioneering new technologies to accelerate on-line shopping with easy to use mobile devices, and new apps that make shopping, paying and tracking deliveries easier all the time. But WalMart has largely eschewed the on-line world as its CEO has doggedly sticks with WalMart doing more of the same. That pursuit has limited WalMart's growth, and margins, while the company files further behind competitively.
Unfortunately, WalMart peaked at about $70 in 2000, and has been flat ever since. Investors have gained nothing from this strategy, while employees often work for wages that leave them on the poverty line and without benefits. Scandals across all management layers are embarrassing. Communities find Walmart a mixed bag, initially lowering prices on some goods, but inevitably gutting the local retailers and leaving the community with no local market suppliers. WalMart needs an entirely new strategy to remain viable – and that will not come from Mr. Duke. He should have been gone long before the recent scandal, and surely now.
#2 Edward Lampert, Sears Holdings. OK, Mr. Lampert is the Chairman and not the CEO – but there is no doubt who calls the shots at Sears. And as Mr. Lampert has called the shots, nobody has gained.
Once the most critical force in retailing, since Mr. Lampert took over Sears has become wholly irrelevant. Hoping that Mr. Lampert could make hay out of the vast real estate holdings, and once glorious brands Craftsman, Kenmore and Diehard to turn around the struggling giant, the stock initially took off rising from $30 in 2004 to $170 in 2007 as Jim Cramer of "Mad Money" fame flogged the stock over and over on his rant-a-thon show. But when it was clear results were constantly worsening, as revenues and same-store-sales kept declining, the stock fell out of bed dropping into the $30s in 2009 and again in 2012.
Hope springs eternal in the micro-managing Mr. Lampert. Everyone knows of his personal fortune (#367 on Forbes list of billionaires.) But Mr. Lampert has destroyed Sears. The company may already be so far gone as to be unsavable. The stock price is based upon speculation of asset sales. Mr. Lampert had no idea, from the beginning, how to create value from Sears and he surely should have been gone many months ago as the hyped expectations demonstrably never happened.
#1 – Steve Ballmer, Microsoft. Without a doubt, Mr. Ballmer is the worst CEO of a large publicly traded American company. Not only has he singlehandedly steered Microsoft out of some of the fastest growing and most lucrative tech markets (mobile music, handsets and tablets) but in the process he has sacrificed the growth and profits of not only his company but "ecosystem" companies such as Dell, Hewlett Packard and even Nokia. The reach of his bad leadership has extended far beyond Microsoft when it comes to destroying shareholder value – and jobs.
Microsoft peaked at $60/share in 2000, just as Mr. Ballmer took the reigns. By 2002 it had fallen into the $20s, and has only rarely made it back to its current low $30s value. And no wonder, since execution of new rollouts were constantly delayed, and ended up with products so lacking in any enhanced value that they left customers scrambling to find ways to avoid upgrades. By Mr. Ballmer's own admission Vista had over 200 man-years too much cost, and its launch still, years late, has users avoiding upgrades. Microsoft 7 and Office 2012 did nothing to excite tech users, in corporations or at home, as Apple took the leadership position in personal technology.
So today Microsoft, after dumping Zune, dumping its tablet, dumping Windows CE and other mobile products, is still the same company Mr. Ballmer took control over a decade ago. Microsoft is PC company, nothing more, as demand for PCs shifts to mobile. Years late to market, he has bet the company on Windows 8 – as well as the future of Dell, HP, Nokia and others. An insane bet for any CEO – and one that would have been avoided entirely had the Microsoft Board replaced Mr. Ballmer years ago with a CEO that understands the fast pace of technology shifts and would have kept Microsoft current with market trends.
Although he's #19 on Forbes list of billionaires, Mr. Ballmer should not be allowed to take such incredible risks with investor money and employee jobs. Best he be retired to enjoy his fortune rather than deprive investors and employees of building theirs.
There were a lot of notable CEO changes already in 2012. Research in Motion, Best Buy and American Airlines are just three examples. But the 5 CEOs in this column are well on the way to leading their companies into the kind of problems those 3 have already discovered. Hopefully the Boards will start to pay closer attention, and take action before things worsen.
by Adam Hartung | Apr 4, 2012 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Whirlpool, Leadership, Lock-in, Web/Tech
Understand your core strength, and protect it. Sounds like the key to success, and a simple motto. It's the mantra of many a management guru. Only, far too often, it's the road to ruin.
The last week 3 big announcements showed just how damning the "strategy" of building on historical momentum can be.
Start with Research in Motion's revenue and earnings announcement. Both metrics fell short of expectations as Blackberry sales continue to slide. Not many investors were actually surprised about this, to be honest. iOS and Android products have been taking away share from RIM for several months, and the trend remains clear. And investors have paid a heavy price.
Source: BusinessInsider.com
There is no doubt the executives at RIM are very aware of this performance, and desperately would like the results to be different. RIM has known for months that iOS and Android handhelds have been taking share. The executives aren't unaware, nor stupid. But, they have not been able to change the internal momentum at RIM to the right issues.
The success formula at RIM has long been to "own" the enterprise marketplace with the Blackberry server products, offering easy to connect and secure network access for email, texting and enterprise applications. Handsets came along with the server and network sales. All the momentum at RIM has been to focus on the needs of IT departments; largely security and internal connectivity to legacy systems and email. And, honestly, even today there is probably nobody better at that than RIM.
But the market shifted. Individual user needs and productivity began to trump the legacy issues. People wanted to leave their laptops at home, and do everything with their smartphones. Apps took on a far more dominant role, as did ease of use. Because these were not part of the internal momentum at RIM the company ignored those issues, maintaining its focus on what it believed was the core strength, especially amongst its core customers.
Now RIM is toast. It's share will keep falling, until its handhelds become as popular as Palm devices. Perhaps there will be a market for its server products, but only via an acquisition at a very low price. Momentum to protect the core business killed RIM because its leaders failed to recognize a critical market shift.
Turn next to Yahoo's announcement that it is laying off 1 out of 7 employees, and that this is not likely to be the last round of cuts. Yahoo has become so irrelevant that analysts now depicct its "core" markets as "worthless."
Source: SiliconAlleyInsider.com
Yahoo was an internet pioneer. At one time in the 1990s it was estimated that over 90% of browser home pages were set to Yahoo! But the need for content aggregation largely disappeared as users learned to use search and social media to find what they wanted. Ad placement revenue for keywords transferred to the leading search provider (Google) and for display ads to the leading social media provider (Facebook.)
But Yahoo steadfastly worked to defend and extend its traditional business. It enhanced its homepage with a multitude of specialty pages, such as YahooFinance. But each of these has been outdone by specialist web sites, such as Marketwatch.com, that deliver everyhing Yahoo does only better, attracting more advertisers. Yahoo's momentum caused it to miss shifting with the internet market. Under CEO Bartz the company focused on operational improvements and efforts at enhancing its sales, while market shifts made its offerings less and less relevant.
Now, Yahoo is worth only the value of its outside stockholdings, and it appears the new CEO lacks any strategy for saving the enterprise. The company appears ready to split up, and become another internet artifact for Wikipedia. Largely because it kept doing more of what it knew how to do and was unable to overcome momentum to do anything new.
Last, but surely not least, was the Dell announced acquisition of Wyse.
Dell is synonymous with PC. But the growth has left PCs, and Dell missed the markets for mobile entertainment devices (like iPods or Zunes,) smartphones (like iPhone or Evo) and tablets (like iPads and Galaxy Tab.) Dell slavisly kept to its success formula of doing no product development, leaving that to vendors Microsoft and Intel, as it focused on hardware manufacturing and supply chain excellence. As the market shifted from the technologies it knew Dell kept trying to cut costs and product prices, hoping that somehow people would be dissuaded from changing technologies. Only it hasn't worked, and Dell's growth in sales and profits has evaporated.
Don't be confused. Buying Wyse has not changed Dell's "core." In Wyse Dell found another hardware manufacturer, only one that makes old-fashioned "dumb" terminals for large companies (interpret that as "enterprise,") mostly in health care. This is another acquisition, like Perot Systems, in an effort to copy the 1980s IBM brand extension into other products and services that are in like markets – a classic effort at extending the original Dell success formula with minimal changes.
Wyse is not a "cloud" company. Rackspace, Apple and Amazon provide cloud services, and Wyse is nothing like those two market leaders. Buying Wyse is Dell's effort to keep chasing HP for market share, and trying to pick up other pieces of revenue as it extends is hardware sales into more low-margin markets. The historical momentum has not changed, just been slightly redirected. By letting momentum guide its investments, Dell is buying another old technology company it hopes it can can extend its "supply chain" strenths into – and maybe find new revenues and higher margins. Not likely.
Over and again we see companies falter due to momentum. Why? Markets shift. Faster and more often than most business leaders want to admit. For years leaders have been told to understand core strengths, and protect them. But this approach fails when your core strength loses its value due to changes in technologies, user preferences, competition and markets. Then the only thing that can keep a company successful is to shift. Often very far from the core – and very fast.
Success actually requires overcoming internal momentum, built on the historical success formula, by putting resources into new solutions that fulfill emerging needs. Being agile, flexible and actually able to pivot into new markets creates success. Forget the past, and the momentum it generates. That can kill you.
