by Adam Hartung | Jul 15, 2014 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Swamp, Leadership
Famed actor and comedian Tracy Morgan has filed a lawsuit against Walmart. He was seriously injured, and his companion and fellow comedian James McNair was killed, when their chauffeured vehicle was struck by a WalMart truck going too fast under the control of an overly tired driver.
It would be easy to write this off as a one-time incident. As something that was the mistake of one employee, and not a concern for management. Walmart is huge, and anyone could easily say “mistakes will happen, so don’t worry.” And as the country’s largest company (by sales and employees) Walmart is an easy target for lawsuits.
But that would belie a much more concerning situation. One that should have investors plenty worried.
Walmart isn’t doing all that well. It is losing customers, even as the economy recovers. For a decade Walmart has struggled to grow revenues, and same store sales have declined – only to be propped up by store closings. Despite efforts to grow offshore, attempts at international expansion have largely been flops. Efforts to expand into smaller stores have had mixed success, and are marginal at generating new revenues in urban efforts. Meanwhile, Walmart still has no coherent strategy for on-line sales expansion.
Unfortunately the numbers don’t look so good for Walmart, a company that is absolutely run by numbers. Every single thing that can be tracked in Walmart is tracked, and managed – right down the temperature in every facility (store, distribution hub, office) 24x7x365. When the revenue, inventory turns, margin, distribution costs, etc. aren’t going in the right direction Walmart is a company where leadership applies the pressure to employees, right down the chain, to make things better.
Unfortunately, a study by Northwestern University Kellogg School of Management has shown that when a culture is numbers driven it often leads to selfish, and unethical, behavior. When people are focused onto the numbers, they tend to stretch the ethical (and possibly legal) boundaries to achieve those numerical goals. A great recent example was the U.S. Veterans Administration scandal where management migrated toward lying about performance in order to meet the numerical mandates set by Secretary Shinseki.
Back in November, 2012 I pointed out that the Walmart bribery scandal in Mexico was a warning sign of big problems at the mega-retailer. Pushed too hard to create success, Walmart leadership was at least skirting with the law if not outright violating it. I projected these problems would worsen, and sure enough by November the bribery probe was extended to Walmart’s operations in Brazil, China and India.
We know from the many employee actions happening at Walmart that in-store personnel are feeling pressure to do more with fewer hours. It does not take a great leap to consider it possible (likely?) that distribution personnel, right down to truck drivers are feeling pressured to work harder, get more done with less, and in some instances being forced to cut corners in order to improve Walmart’s numbers.
Exactly how much the highest levels of Walmart knows about any one incident is impossible to gauge at this time. However, what should concern investors is whether the long-term culture of Walmart – obsessed about costs and making the numbers – has created a situation where all through the ranks people are feeling the need to walk closer to ethical, and possibly legal, lines. While it may be that no manager told the driver to drive too fast or work too many hours, the driver might have felt the pressure from “higher up” to get his load to its destination at a certain time – or risk his job, or maybe his boss’s.
If this is a widespread cultural issue – look out! The legal implications could be catastrophic if customers, suppliers and communities discover widespread unethical behavior that went unchecked by top echelons. The C suite executives don’t have to condone such behavior to be held accountable – with costs that can be exorbitant. Just ask the leaders at JPMorganChase and Citibank who are paying out billions for past transgressions.
Worse, we cannot expect the marketplace pressures to ease up any time soon for Walmart. Competitors are struggling mightily. JCPenney cannot seem to find anyone to take the vacant CEO job as sales remain below levels of several years ago, and the chain is most likely going to have to close several dozen (or hundreds) of stores. Sears/KMart has so many closed and underperforming stores that practically every site is available for rent if anyone wants it. And in the segment which is even lower priced than Walmart, the “dollar stores,” direct competitor Family Dollar saw 3rd quarter profits fall another 33% as too many stores and too few customer wreak financial havoc and portend store closings.
So the market situation is not improving for Walmart. As competition has intensified, all signs point to a leadership which tried to do “more, better, faster, cheaper.” But there is no way to maintain the original Walmart strategy in the face of the on-line competitive onslaught which is changing the retail game. Walmart has continued to do “more of the same” trying to defend and extend its old success formula, when it was a disruptive innovator that stole its revenues and cut into profits. Now all signs point to a company which is in grave danger of over-extending its success formula to the point of unethical, and potentially illegal, behavior.
If that doesn’t scare the heck out of Walmart investors I can’t imagine what would.
by Adam Hartung | Oct 27, 2010 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Swamp, Leadership, Web/Tech
Summary:
- We like to think of "mature" businesses as good
- AT&T was a "mature" business, yet it failed
- "Maturity" leads to inward focus, and an unwillingness to adjust to market shifts
- Microsoft is trying to reposition itself as a "mature" company
- Despite its historical strengths, Microsoft has astonishing parallels to AT&T
- Growth is less risky than "maturity" for investors, employees and customers
Why doesn't your business grow like Apple or Google? Is it because you think of your business, or the marketplace you serve, as "mature?" Quite a euphanism, maturity. It sounds so good. How could being "mature" be bad? As children we strive to be "mature." The leader is usually the most "mature" person in the group. Those who like good art have "mature" taste. Surely, we should want to be "mature." And we should want our businesses to reach "maturity" and have "mature" leaders who don't take unnecessary risks. Once "mature" the business should be safe for investors, employees, suppliers and customers.
That was probably what the folks at AT&T thought. When judge Greene broke up AT&T in 1984 the company had a near monopoly on long-distance. AT&T was a "mature" company in a "mature" telephone industry. It appeared as though all AT&T had to do was keep serving its customers, making regular improvements to its offering, to perpetually maintain its revenue, jobs and profitability. A very "mature" company, AT&T's "mature" management knew everything there was to know about long distance – about everything related to communications. And due to its previous ownership of Bell Labs and Western Union, it had deep knowledge about emerging technologies and manufacturing costs allowing AT*T to make "mature" decisions about investing in future markets and products. This "mature" company would be able to pay out dividends forever! It seemed ridiculous to think that AT&T would go anywhere but up!
Unfortunately, things didn't work out so well. The "mature" AT&T saw its market share attacked by upstarts MCI and Sprint. As a few "early adopters" switched services – largely residential and other very small customers – AT&T was unworried. It still had most of the market and fat profits. As these relatively insignificant small users switched, AT&T reinforced its world's largest billing system as an incomparable strength, and reminded everyone that its "enterprise" (corporate) offerings were still #1 (anybody remember AT&T long distance cards issued by your employer for use at pay phones?).
But unfortunately, what looked like an unassailable market position in 1984 was eventually diminished dramatically as not only homeowners but corporations started shifting to new offerings from competitors. New pricing plans, "bundled" products and ease of use encouraged people to try a new provider. And that AT&T had become hard to work with, full of rules and procedures that were impossible for the customer to comprehend, further encouraged people to try an alternative. Customers simply got fed up with rigid service, outdated products and high prices.
Unexpectedly, for AT&T, new markets started to grow much faster and become more profitable than long distance voice. Data services started using a lot more capacity, and even residential customers started wanting to log onto the internet. Even though AT&T had been the leader (and onetime monopolist – did you know broadcast television was distributed over an AT&T network?) with these services, this "mature" company continued to focus on its traditional voice business – and was woefully late to offer commercial or residential customers new products. Not only were dial-up offerings delayed, but higher speed ISDN and DSL services went almost entirely to competitors.
And, much to the chagrin of AT&T leaders, customers started using their mobile phones a lot more. Initially viewed as expensive toys, AT&T did not believe that the infrastructure would be built quickly, nor be robust enough, to support a large base of cellular phone users. Further, AT&T anticipated pricing would keep most people from using these new products. Not to mention the fact that these new phones simply weren't very good – as compared to land-line services according to the metrics used by AT&T. The connection quality was wildly inferior to traditional long distance, and frequently calls were completely dropped! So AT&T was slow to enter this market, half-hearted in its effort, and failed to make any profits.
Along the way a lot of other "non-core" business efforts failed. There was the acquisition of Paradyne, an early leader in modems, that did not evolve with fast changing technology. New products made Paradyne's early products obsolete and the division disappeared. And the acquisition of computer maker NCR failed horribly after AT&T attempted to "improve" management and "synergize" it with the AT&T customer base and offerings.
AT&T had piles and piles of cash from its early monopoly. But most of that money was spent trying to defend the long distance business. That didn't work. Then there was money lost by wheelbarrow loads trying to enter the data and mobile businesses too late, and with little new to offer. And of course the money spent on acquisitions that AT&T really didn't know how to manage was all down the proverbial drain.
Despite its early monopoly, high cash flow, technology understanding, access to almost every customer and piles of cash, AT&T failed. Today the company named AT&T is a renamed original regional Bell operatiing company (RBOC) created in the 1984 break-up — Southwestern Bell. This classically "mature" company, a stock originally considered "safe" for investing in the "widow's and orphan's fund" used up its money and became obsolete. "Mature" was a misnomer used to allow AT&T to hide within itself; to focus on its past, instead of its future. By being satisfied with saying it was "mature" and competing in "mature" markets, AT&T allowed itself to ignore important market shifts. In just 25 years the company that ushered in mass communications, that had an incredibly important history, disappeared.
I was struck today when a Reuters story appeared with the headline "Sleepy in Seattle: Microsoft Learns to Mature." There's that magic word – "mature." While the article lays out concerns with Microsoft, there were still analysts quoted as saying that investors didn't need to worry about Microsoft's future. Investors simply need to change their thinking. Instead of a "growth" company, they should start thinking of Microsoft as a "mature" company. It sounds so reassuring. After all:
- Microsoft has a near monopoly in its historical business
- Microsoft has a huge R&D budget, and is familiar with all the technologies
- Microsoft has piles and piles of cash
- Microsoft has huge margins in its traditional business – in fact profits in operating systems and office automation exceed 100% of the total because it loses billions of dollars in other things like Bing, MSN and its incredibly expensive foray into gaming systems (xBox)
- Markets won't shift any time soon – say to this new "cloud computing" – and Microsoft will surely have products when they are needed if there is a market shift
- While home users may buy these new smartphones, tablets and some Macs, enterprise customers will keep using the technology they've long purchased
- Microsoft is smart to move slowly into new markets, it shouldn't cannibalize its existing business by encouraging customers to change platforms. Going slow and being late is a good thing for profits
- Although Microsoft has been late to smartphones and tablets, with all their money and size surely when they do get to market they will beat these upstarts Apple and Google, et. al.
Sure made me think about AT&T. And the fact that Apple is now worth more than Microsoft. Made me wonder just how comfortable investors should be with a "mature" Microsoft. Made me wonder how much investors, employees and customers should trust a "mature" CEO Ballmer.
Looking at the last 10 years, it seems like there's a lot more risk in "mature" companies than in "growth" ones. We can be almost certain that Apple and Google, which have produced huge returns for investors, will grow for the next 3 years, improving cash flow and profitability just by remaining in existing new markets. But of course both have ample new products pioneering yet more new markets. And companies like NetApp look pretty safe, building a fast-growing base of customers who are already switching to cloud computing – and producing healthy cash flow in the emerging marketplace.
Meanwhile, the track record for "mature" companies would leave something to be desired. One could compare Amazon to Circuit City or Sears. Or just list some names: AT&T, General Motors, Chrysler, Xerox, Kodak, AIG, Citibank, Dell, EDS, Sun Microsystems. Of course each of these is unique, with its own story. Yet….
by Adam Hartung | May 10, 2010 | Defend & Extend, General, In the Swamp, Innovation, Leadership, Openness
Did you ever carve into a tree, then return to look at the carving years later? If you did, you would have seen that the carving is the same distance from the ground. The tree grew from the outside, from its branches, not from the bottom. The roots and trunk feed the growth, which occurs where the tree meets the environment – growing toward the sun for photosynthetic feeding.
Too many organizations, however, try to grow from the bottom rather than from the branches. Instead of looking to the environment for growth, they look inside. Instead of seeing the roots and trunk as sources of water and minerals (resources for growth) the strategists and leaders spend most of their time thinking about how to protect, or even grow, the "core" source of the tree. Far too little time is spent thinking about the environment and how to push resources where greatest growth can occur.
In a recent Harvard Business Review web posting "The Strategic Imperative Not to Hire Anybody" the author points out that many CEOs are now desirous of growth. But their approach is very flawed. They are enamored with all the headcount reductions of the last few years, and want to grow revenues without adding any additional resources. They are impressed that they grew profits by cutting employees, and now want to grow revenues and profits without any new ones. They "saved the core" by pruning branches, and expect the growth to rematerialize easily.
Discussing how these CEOs came to such a surprising position, that they should be able to grow without adding new resources, the author Walter Kiechel points out that most strategy in corporations has little to do with understanding new markets, new needs – new sunlight. Instead, strategists have been trained in how to improve the efficiency of the root system and trunk supply chain. Their focus has been on optimizing what exists, cutting resources, improving efficiency. What passes for strategy today has little to do with finding new sunlight, and competing effectively with other plants to get it. Instead, strategy is almost all internal analysis to improve how the existing tree maximizes its use of the dirt. How the tree will re-bark the old carving, and sustain its old position. Even ignoring other ground plants that are leaching away minerals and moisture, and other rapidly growing trees that are interfering with sunlight – each year coming closer to the original tree and making it impossible to find sun where it used to be plentiful.
Bloomberg-BusinessWeek makes note of this phenomenon discussing the problems at Goldman Sachs in "Goldman Sachs: Failure of Innovation." Author Rick Wartzman points out that within Goldman, and almost all other banks, the very smart MBAs from Harvard, Stanford, Columbia, Wharton and elsewhere really weren't developing products which would help the banks grow. They weren't developing new financing or investing opportunities that would generate economic growth. Instead, an internal focus led them to develop collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) which had only the intent of reducing risk and increasing return for the existing business. These were defensive, protective products intended to Defend & Extend the old products – not create anything new. Goldman wasn't creating economic growth for its clients, or itself, with CDOs. They were implementing classic D&E behavior – trying to protect the trunk.
Growth happens from the branches. On the edge of the business, where it meets the environment. Growth happens when we focus on how to competitively acquire more sunlight, and use that to maximize the value of our resources. An efficient resource delivery system is helpful, but continued optimizing of that system does not create growth. Unless there is a robust method of identifying new markets, and pushing resources toward those, you simply cannot grow. What strategists need to do is spend a lot more time thinking about markets and competitors if they want to create growth – and a lot less time thinking about how to optimize the "core." If the bankers at Goldman, Bank of America, Merrill Lynch, Citibank, etc. had done that we would have a far more robust economy now. And if leaders want to start growing in 2010 and 2011 they need to change the focus of their strategy group – and figure out how to put new resources into growth areas of the environment!
by Adam Hartung | Sep 15, 2009 | Current Affairs, General, In the Whirlpool, Leadership, Lock-in
The Real Blindness Behind The Collapse
Adam Hartung,
09.14.09, 05:00 PM EDT
The exact same failing brought down Wall Street, Detroit and Main Street's real estate speculators.
"Too big to fail" is a new phrase in the American lexicon, born in the economic crisis that gave us a bankrupt Lehman Brothers and the shotgun marriage of Merrill Lynch with Bank of America.
Nobody really knows what it means, except that somehow in the banking
world, central bankers can decide that some institutions–like AIG, Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase and BofA–are so big they simply have to be kept alive.
This is the first paragraph in my latest column for Forbes. There is much EVERY business leader can learn from the collapse of Lehman. Learn about risk, and about how to succeed in a shifting marketplace. Please give the Forbes article a read – and put on a comment! Everybody enjoys reading what others think!
by Adam Hartung | May 27, 2009 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, Disruptions, General, Leadership, Lock-in, Openness, Quotes
"The Need for Failure" is a recent Forbes article on why it is bad – really bad – to prop up failing institutions. The author is an esteemed economics professor at NYU. He says "too big to fail is dangerous. It suggests there is an insurance policy that says, no matter how risky your behavior, we will make sure you stay in business." Rightly said, only it creates a conundrum. Large organizations are not known for taking risky actions. Large organizations are known primarily for lethargic decision-making which weeds out all forms of risk – right down to how people dress and what they can say in the office. When you think of a big bank, like Bank of America or Citibank, you don't think of risk. You think just the opposite. Of risk aversion so great they cannot do anything new or different.
What I'd add to the good professor's article is recognition that large organizations stumble into risk they don't recognize, by trying to do more of the same when that behavior becomes risky due to market changes. My dad said that 100 years ago when my grandfather was first given pills by a doctor he decided to take the whole bottle at once. His logic was "if one pill will help me, I might as well take the whole lot and get better fast." Clearly, an example where doing more of the same was not a good idea. Then there was the boy who loved jumping off the railroad bridge into the river. He did it all the time, year after year. Then one month there was a draught, the river level fell while he was busy at school, and when he next jumped off the bridge he broke his leg. He did what he always did, but the environmental change suddenly made his previous behavior very risky.
Big corporations behave this way. They build Lock-ins around everything they do. They use hierarchy, cultural norm enforcement, sacred cows, rigid decision-making systems, narrow strategy processes, consistency in hiring practices, inflexible IT systems, knowledge silos and dependence on large investments to make sure the organization cannot flex. The intent of these Lock-ins is to make sure that historical decisions are replicated, to make sure past behaviors are repeated again and again with the expectation that those behaviors will consistently produce the same returns.
But when the market shifts these Lock-ins create risk that is unseen. Bankers had built systems for generating their own loans, and acquiring loans from others, that were designed to keep growing. They designed various derivative products as their own form of insurance on their assets. But what they did not recognize was that pushing forward in highly unregulated product markets, as the quality of debtors declined, created unexpected risk. In other words, doing more of the same did not reduce risk – it increased the risk! Because the company is designed to undertake these behaviors, there is no one who can recognize that the risk is growing. There is no one who challenges whether doing more of the same is risky – only those who would challenge making a change by saying change is risky!
Bear Stearns, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Lehman Brothers and AIG all created a much higher risk than they ever anticipated. And they never saw it. Because they were doing what they always did – and expecting the results would take care of themselves. They were measuring their own behaviors, not the behavior of the market. And thus they missed recognizing that the market had moved – and thus doing more of the same was inherently risky.
(The same is true of GM, for example. GM kept doing what it always did, refusing to see the risk it incurred by ignoring market shifts brought on by changing customer behaviors, rising energy costs and offshore competitors.)
That's why big company CEOs feel OK about asking for a bail-out. To them, they did not fail. They did not take risk. They did what they had always done – and something went wrong "out there". Something went wrong "in the market". Not in their company. They need protection from the marketplace.
Of course, this is just the opposite of what free markets are all about. Free markets are intended to allow changes to develop, forcing competitors to adapt to market shifts or fail. But those who run (or ran) our big banks, and many of our big industrial companies, haven't see it that way. They believe their size means they are the market – so they want regulators to change the market back. Back to where they can make money again.
So how is this to to be avoided? It starts by having leaders who can recognize market shifts, and recognize the need for change. In an companion Forbes article "Jamie Dimon's Straight Talk Has A Good Ring" the author takes time to review J.P. Morgan Chase's Chairman's letter to shareholders regarding 2008. In the letter, surprisingly for a big organization, the JPMC Chairman points out market shifts, and then points out that his organization made mistakes by not reacting fast enough – for example by changing practices on acquiring mortgages from independent brokers. He goes no to point out that several changes have happened, and will continue happening, at JPMC to deal with market shifts. And he even comments on future scenarios which he hopes will help protect investors from the hidden risk of companies that take actions based on history.
Mr. Dimon's actions demonstrate a willingness to implement The Phoenix Principle. For those who don't know him, Mr. Dimon has long been one of the more controversial figures in banking. He is well known for exhibiting highly Disruptive behavior, yet he has found his way up the corporate ranks of the traditional banking industry. Now he is not being shy about Disrupting his own bank – JPMC.
- His discussion of future scenarios clearly points to expected changes in the market, from competitor shifts, economic shifts and regulatory shifts which his bank must address.
- He sees competitors changing, and the need for JPMC to compete differently with different sorts of institutions under different regulations. Mr. Dimon clearly has his eyes on competitors, and he intends for JPMC to grow as a result of the market shift, not merely "hang on."
- He is espousing Disruptions for his company, the industry and the regulatory environment. By going public with his views, excoriating insurance regulators as well as unregulated hedge funds, he intends for his employees and investors to think hard about what caused past problems and how important it is to change.
- He keeps trying new and different things to improve growth and performance at the company. It's not merely "more of the same, but hopefully cheaper." He is proposing new approaches for lending as well as investing – and for significant changes in regulations now that banking is global.
Very few leaders recognize the risk from doing more of the same. Leaders often feel it is conservative to not change course. But, when markets shift, not changing course introduces dramatic risk. People just don't perceive it. Because they are looking at the past, not at the future. They are measuring risk based upon what they know – what they've failed to take into account. And the only way to overcome this problem is to spend a lot more time on market scenarios, competitor analysis and using Disruptions to keep the organization vital and connected with the market using White Space projects.
