Sayonara Sony – How Industrial, MBA Management Killed a Great Company

Who can forget what a great company Sony was, and the enormous impact it had on our lives?  With its heritage, it is hard to believe that Sony hasn't made a profit in 4 consecutive years, just recently announced it will double its expected loss for this year to $6.4 billion, has only 15% of its capital left as equity (debt/equity ration of 5.67x) and is only worth 1/4 of its value 10 years ago!

After World War II Sony was the company that took the transistor technology invented by Texas Instruments (TI) and made the popular, soon to become ubiquitous, transistor radio.  Under co-founder Akio Morita Sony kept looking for advances in technology, and its leadership spent countless hours innovatively thinking about how to apply these advances to improve lives.  With a passion for creating new markets, Sony was an early creator, and dominator, of what we now call "consumer electronics:"

  • Sony improved solid state transistor radios until they surpassed the quality of tubes, making good quality sound available very reliably, and inexpensively
  • Sony developed the solid state television, replacing tubes to make TVs more reliable, better working and use less energy
  • Sony developed the Triniton television tube, which dramatically improved the quality of color (yes Virginia, once TV was all in black & white) and enticed an entire generation to switch.  Sony also expanded the size of Trinitron to make larger sets that better fit larger homes.
  • Sony was an early developer of videotape technology, pioneering the market with Betamax before losing a battle with JVC to be the standard (yes Virginia, we once watched movies on tape)
  • Sony pioneered the development of camcorders, for the first time turning parents – and everyone – into home movie creators
  • Sony pioneered the development of independent mobile entertainment by creating the Walkman, which allowed – for the first time – people to take their own recorded music with them, via cassette tapes
  • Sony pioneered the development of compact discs for music, and developed the Walkman CD for portable use
  • Sony gave us the Playstation, which went far beyond Nintendo in creating the products that excited users and made "home gaming" a market.

Very few companies could ever boast a string of such successful products.  Stories about Sony management meetings revealed a company where executives spent 85% of their time on technology, products and new applications/markets, 10% on human resource issues and 5% on finance.  To Mr. Morita financial results were just that – results – of doing a good job developing new products and markets.  If Sony did the first part right, the results would be good.  And they were.

By the middle 1980s, America was panicked over the absolute domination of companies like Sony in product manufacturing.  Not only consumer electronics, but automobiles, motorcycles, kitchen electronics and a growing number of markets.  Politicians referred to Japanese competitors, like the wildly successful Sony, as "Japan Inc." – and discussed how the powerful Japanese Ministry of Trade and Industry (MITI) effectively shuttled resources around to "beat" American manufacturers.  Even as rising petroleum costs seemed to cripple U.S. companies, Japanese manufacturers were able to turn innovations (often American) into very successful low-cost products growing sales and profits.

So what went wrong for Sony?

Firstly was the national obsession with industrial economics.  W. Edward Deming in 1950s Japan institutionalized manufacturing quality and optimization.  Using a combination of process improvements and arithmetic, Deming convinced Japanese leaders to focus, focus, focus on making things better, faster and cheaper.  Taking advantage of Japanese post war dependence on foreign capital, and foreign markets, this U.S. citizen directed Japanese industry into an obsession with industrialization as practiced in the 1940s — and was credited for creating the rapid massive military equipment build-up that allowed the U.S. to defeat Japan.

Unfortunately, this narrow obsession left Japanese business leaders, buy and large, with little skill set for developing and implementing R&D, or innovation, in any other area.  As time passed, Sony fell victim to developing products for manufacturing, rather than pioneering new markets

The Vaio, as good as it was, had little technology for which Sony could take credit.  Sony ended up in a cost/price/manufacturing war with Dell, HP, Lenovo and others to make cheap PCs – rather than exciting products.  Sony's evolved a distinctly Industrial strategy, focused on manufacturing and volume, rather than trying to develop uniquely new products that were head-and-shoulders better than competitors.

In mobile phones Sony hooked up with, and eventually acquired, Ericsson.  Again, no new technology or effort to make a wildly superior mobile device (like Apple did.)  Instead Sony sought to build volume in order to manufacture more phones and compete on price/features/functions against Nokia, Motorola and Samsung.  Lacking any product or technology advantage, Samsung clobbered Sony's Industrial strategy with lower cost via non-Japanese manufacturing.

When Sony updated its competition in home movies by introducing Blue Ray, the strategy was again an Industrial one – about how to sell Blue Ray recorders and players.  Sony didn't sell the Blue Ray software technology in hopes people would use it.  Instead it kept it proprietary so only Sony could make and sell Blue Ray products (hardware).  Just as it did in MP3, creating a proprietary version usable only on Sony devices.  In an information economy, this approach didn't fly with consumers, and Blue Ray was a money loser largely irrelevant to the market – as is the now-gone Sony MP3 product line.

We see this across practically all the Sony businesses.  In televisions, for example, Sony has lost the technological advantage it had with Trinitron cathode ray tubes.  In flat screens Sony has applied a predictable, but money losing Industrial strategy trying to compete on volume and cost.  Up against competitors sourcing from lower cost labor, and capital, countries Sony has now lost over $10B over the last 8 years in televisions.  Yet, Sony won't give up and intends to stay with its Industrial strategy even as it loses more money.

Why did Sony's management go along with this?  As mentioned, Akio Morita was an innovator and new market creator.  But, Mr. Morita lived through WWII, and developed his business approach before Deming.  Under Mr. Morita, Sony used the industrial knowledge Deming and his American peers offered to make Sony's products highly competitive against older technologies.  The products led, with industrial-era tactics used to lower cost. 

But after Mr. Morita other leaders were trained, like American-minted MBAs, to implement Industrial strategies.  Their minds put products, and new markets, second.  First was a commitment to volume and production – regardless of the products or the technology.  The fundamental belief was that if you had enough volume, and you cut costs low enough, you would eventually succeed.

By 2005 Sony reached the pinnacle of this strategic approach by installing a non-Japanese to run the company.  Sir Howard Stringer made his fame running Sony's American business, where he exemplified Industrial strategy by cutting 9,000 of 30,000 U.S. jobs (almost a full third.) To Mr. Stringer, strategy was not about innovation, technology, products or new markets.  

Mr. Stringer's Industrial strategy was to be obsessive about costs. Where Mr. Morita's meetings were 85% about innovation and market application, Mr. Stringer brought a "modern" MBA approach to the Sony business, where numbers – especially financial projections – came first.  The leadership, and management, at Sony became a model of MBA training post-1960.  Focus on a narrow product set to increase volume, eschew costly development of new technologies in favor of seeking high-volume manufacturing of someone else's technology, reduce product introductions in order to extend product life, tooling amortization and run lengths, and constantly look for new ways to cut costs.  Be zealous about cost cutting, and reward it in meetings and with bonuses.

Thus, during his brief tenure running Sony Mr. Stringer will not be known for new products.  Rather, he will be remembered for initiating 2 waves of layoffs in what was historically a lifetime employment company (and country.)  And now, in a nod to Chairman Stringer the new CEO at Sony has indicated he will  react to ongoing losses by – you guessed it – another round of layoffs.  This time it is estimated to be another 10,000 workers, or 6% of the employment.  The new CEO, Mr. Hirai, trained at the hand of Mr. Stringer, demonstrates as he announces ever greater losses that Sony hopes to – somehow – save its way to prosperity with an Industrial strategy.

Japanese equity laws are very different that the USA.  Companies often have much higher debt levels.  And companies can even operate with negative equity values – which would be technical bankruptcy almost everywhere else.  So it is not likely Sony will fill bankruptcy any time soon. 

But should you invest in Sony?  After 4 years of losses, and entrenched Industrial strategy with MBA-style leadership focused on "numbers" rather than markets, there is no reason to think the trajectory of sales or profits will change any time soon. 

As an employee, facing ongoing layoffs why would you wish to work at Sony?  A "me too" product strategy with little technical innovation that puts all attention on cost reduction would not be a fun place.  And offers little promotional growth. 

And for suppliers, it is assured that each and every meeting will be about how to lower price – over, and over, and over.

Every company today can learn from the Sony experience.  Sony was once a company to watch. It was an innovative leader, that pioneered new markets.  Not unlike Apple today.  But with its Industrial strategy and MBA numbers- focused leadership it is now time to say, sayonara.  Sell Sony, there are more interesting companies to watch and more profitable places to invest.

Stuck in old products – Nokia, Apple, Smartphones


Be very, very good at what you do.  Once that was the mantra for business successIn Search of Excellence sold millions of copies because it brought forward the idea that companies which excelled at identifying and delivering customer value sold more and made more money.  Not bad advice at the time. And from that advice grew all kinds of recommendations to understand “core” customers, capabilities, technologies, costs, etc. – then benchmark your performance against competitors and do more so you remain #1.  That thinking has been around for 30 years.  Unfortunately, its far from enough to create success in 2010.

Motorola was once #1 in mobile phones.  It had developed smartphones, but they were not part of the core product line.  So Motorola did everything it could to keep selling Razrs. 

Apple-v-MOT-mobile-shipments 07-10
Source:  Silicon Alley Insider

When Apple introduced the iPhone Motorola was selling 35 miillion units/quarter.  Three years later Apple is shipping more iPhones than Motorola is shipping all its phones.  By creating a marketplace disruption Apple knocked Motorola out of first place in mobile phones.  Motorola stuck to what it new best, and despite its great strengths in its traditional core competencies and markets saw revenues and profits plummet.

Nokia did a much better job of maintaining unit volume in handsets. But unfortunately it has had to drop prices dramatically to maintain volumes.  Profits have evaporated, and nobody really cares much about what Nokia is doing any more – despite its huge handset volumes.  The excitement, and profitability, is going to the smaller unit volume Apple.  As a result, the market value of Nokia had dropped more than 50%, while the market value of Apple has exploded 200%!

Apple-v-nokia valuation 7.10
Source: Silicon Alley Insider

Both Motorola and Nokia maintained a focus on their “core.”  Core markets, products and competencies.  Yet, they are now market inert.  Motorola is in oblivion.  And that’s the message in the Forbes article “Stop Focusing on Your Core Business.”  We easily become obsessed with doing what we’ve historically done well better, faster and cheaper.  So obsessed we miss market shifts.  And that is deadly.  Only those companies that can transition to new markets – and new competencies —- that can develop new “cores” by not being too closely tied to the old ones – have any hope of long term success.

PS – I bet you think your words are your greatest communication tool.  Think again!  In a great Forbes article “How To Win an Argument Without Words” Nick Morgan describes why body language can be more important than what you say!  Overcome your lock-in to thinking what works in a meeting or presentation and pay attention to what really may make the difference!!

Overcoming metrics to grow – Motorola, Xerox, Kodak, Six Sigman, TQM, Lean

Do all good ideas originate outside the organization?  Of course not.  Motorola understood all the critical technologies for smart phones, and taught Apple how to use them in a joint development project that created the ROKR.  That's just one example of a company that had the idea for growth, but didn't move forward effectively.  In this case Apple captured the value of new technology and a market shift.

On the Harvard Business Review blog site one of consulting firm Innosight's leaders, Mark Johnson, covers two stories of companies that had all the technology and capability to lead their markets, but got Locked-in to old practices.  In "Have You Already Killed Your Next Big Thing" Mr. Johnson talks about Xerox and Kodak – two stories profiled in my 2008 book "Create Marketplace Disruption."  Both companies developed the technology that replaced their early products (Xerox developed desktop publishing and Kodak developed the amateur digital camera.)  But Lock-in kept them doing what they did rather than exploiting their own innovation.

One of the causes is a fascination with metrics.  Again on the Harvard Business Review blog site Roger Martin, Dean of the Rotman School of Management at the University of Toronto, tells us in "Why Good Spreadsheets Make Bad Strategies" that you can't measure everything.  And often the most important information about markets and what you must do to succeed is beyond measuring – at least in the short term. 

Measurements are good control tools.  Measurements can help force a focus on short term improvements.  But measurements, and the concomitant focus, reduces an organization's ability to look laterally.  They lose sight of information from lost customers, from small customers, from fringe customers and fringe competitors.  Measurement often leads to obsession, and a deepening of Defend & Extend behavior.  It's not accidental that doctors often find anorexia patients measure everything in (liquids and solids) and everything out (liquids and solids). 

Measurements are created when a business is doing well.  In the Rapids.  Like Kodak during the 1960s and Xerox in the 1970s.  Measurements are structural Lock-ins that help "institutionalize" the behavior which makes the Success Formula operate most effectively.  And they help growth.  But they do nothing for recognizing a market shift, and when new technology comes along, they stand in the way.  That's why a powerful Six Sigma or Total Quality Management (TQM) or Lean Manufacturing project can help reduce costs short term, but become an enormous barrier to innovation over time when markets shift.  These institutionalized efforts keep people doing what they measure, even if it doesn't really add much incremental value any longer.

To overcome measurement Lock-ins we all have to use scenario planning.  Scenarios can help us see that in a future marketplace, a changed marketplace, measuring what we've been doing won't aid success.  And because we don't yet know what the future market will really look like, we can't just swap out existing metrics for something different.  As we proceed to do new things, in White Space, it's about learning what the right metrics are – about getting into the growth Rapids – before we tie ourselves up in metrics.

Note:  To all readers of my Forbes article last week – there has been an update.  The very professional and polite leadership at Tribune Corporation took the time to educate me about the LBO transition.  As a result I learned that what I previously read, and reported in my column as well as on this blog, as being an investment of employee retirement funds into the LBO was inaccurate.  Although Tribune is in hard times right now, the very good news is that the employee retirement funds were NOT wiped out by the bankruptcy.  The Forbes article has been corrected, and I am thankful to the Tribune Corporation for helping me report accurately on that issue.

Implementing Market Shifts – Google, Android phone, eWallet

"The Google Phone, Unlocked" is a Seeking Alpha article detailing the early release of a Google phone planned for market introduction in 2010.  Will this be successful or not?  Legitimate question – given the success of Apple's iPhone.  And the answer to that really has nothing to do with cell phone technology.  It has everything to do with the downloadable applications.  The market for phones has shifted to where applications are rapidly becoming more important than the phones themselves. 

Which is why "Android to become eWallet" on MediaPost is an important article.  Mpayy is offering an app that supersedes both credit cars and debit cards.  It's Paypal on steroids.  This app allows users who want to buy something to use their phone to instantaneously pay for something.  Users can perform an eBay style transaction with immediate payment.  And they can do this buying products in the Burger King, or Starbucks, or Target

Two things are emerging that represent significant market shifts to which all businesses must react.  Firstly, mobile devices are much more than phones.  They are more than laptops.  They allow people to do a lot more things than they previously could, and these activities can be immediate.  From reading a CAT scan, to finding the closest pizzeria and downloading a coupon, to paying for a Pepsi at the convenience store.  This represents substantially different use of technology.  Those who remain Locked-in to old fashioned credit card/debit card technology – or internet transaction technology – will be left behind as users move quickly to mobile phone payment.

And, secondly, those who rapidly incorporate these opportunities will have advantages.  If you're making your business more internet friendly you are likely fighting the last war.  To be successful in 2012 it will be important you are able to offer real-time transactions buyers can access from their mobile devicePeople will want to find you, find your discounts, and pay you from the device in their hands.  They will want to complete their business seamlessly using their mobile device – without a call, without a browser transaction.  Those who make life easy for customers will increasingly win – and making life easy will mean access via the mobile device

It is increasingly ineffective to build future plans based upon completing projects started last year – or the previous year – or a few  years ago.  Customers don't care about your enterprise system implementation that is X years into implementation.  Customers are running fast – really fast – toward using new, low cost and easily usable technology.  This is a substantial market shift.  And your scenario plans must incorporate these shifts, expect them, and use them to move beyond Locked-in competitors by implementing these shifts fast and effectively.  That allows you to Create Marketplace Disruptions which create superior rates of return.

The vicious growth stall spiral – Motorola

My book talks about Growth Stalls.  Whenever a company sees two consecutive quarters of flat or declining sales or profits, or 2 consecutive quarters where year over year sales or profits were flat or declining, it is in a growth stall.  Unfortunately, only 7% of companies that hit a growth stall will ever again consistently grow at a mere 2%.  Yes, that's damning and almost unbelievable.  And very worrisome given how many companies are now entering growth stalls.

Take a look at Motorola.  They stumbled badly in mobile phones because they didn't keep pushing out new products into the market.  They tried to Defend & Extend their popular Razr product, and eventually profits disappeared as they cut price.  Then sales fell off a cliff as people shifted to newer products.  The stall was created by the company insufficiently pushing innovation into the market, and the market shifted to new solutions.

Now "Motorola to cut more jobs as non-cell business weakens" according to ChicagoBusiness.com by Crain's.  When the mobile business weakened, management took action to "shore up" the business.  It went hunting for a buyer (none found), and it started cutting resources. Including monster layoffs.  But it still had to keep investing or the business would collapse entirely.  This had a cascading, spiraling negative effect on the rest of Motorola.  With resources pushed into the failing cell phone business, there was less management attention and money spent on other businesses.  Those also stopped pushing new innovations to the market.  Now sales of network gear, set-top boxes, and 2-way radios are all down double digits.

So Motorola plans to cut another 7,500 jobsMore resource cuts, which will cause more cuts in innovation, fewer new products, less White Space.  The process of Defending & Extending the past becomes more entrenched, because there are fewer resources around.  What gets cut most is anything new.  The stuff that could generate growth.  Cuts lead to people hoping for an economic recovery that will somehow improve their competitive position.  But it won't.

Motorola is now pinning its future on successful smart phone sales.  But reality is that every quarter Motorola becomes a far more distant provider in mobile phones.  While the best performer had flat volume last quarter, Motorola saw unit sales drop 46%.  Motorola moves farther from the market, and into role of niche player.  And even though cell phones is supposed to be for sale as a business, as we can see the company is diverting resources from the best part of Motorola (non-cell phones) to mobile handsets because they won't quit trying to Defend & Extend that business.

It's now clear that Motorola is in a vicious circle of cutting resources, losing sales, losing market share, discontinuing innovation, delaying new products, cutting more resources, losing more sales, losing more profits, doing even less innovation, offering up even fewer new products, …… Almost no one ever recovers from this spiral.  By trying to Defend & Extend the old business, the actions – including layoffs – significantly harm the business.  With less and less innovation, and fewer resources, the company slips into decline and failure.

And that's why growth stalls are deadly.  They exacerbate Defend & Extend's weakness as a management approach.  The lack of innovation, remaining Locked-in, was what caused the stall.  Blaming a recession is just looking for a bogeyman so the business doesn't have to take responsibility for its own mistake.  But after a couple of quarters of bad performance, the next wave of actions – the "best practices" to "shore up a problem company" – kill it.  The layoffs and resource cuts – especially the delaying or killing of White Space projects and new products – cause customers to accelerate their move to competitors.  And the company simply fails.

Today employees in those companies in growth stalls have a lot to worry about – as do their investors.  If you hear leadership talking about job cuts and other D&E actions – while deflecting blame elsewhere besides the lack of meeting new market needs – then you're best off to find a new job and sell the stock.  These companies will only continue to get weaker, and competitors will displace them as market leaders.  An improving economy will be created by their growing competitors, not them, and their boat will not rise with the tide. 

The solution is obviously not to practice D&E management.  When you identify a growth stall is when all attention needs to be focused on rolling out new solutions to return to growth.  Instead of cutting costs while trying to save the past, the business needs to move as rapidly as possible to the solutions needed in the future.  Old businesses that caused the stall need to see dramatic resource constraints, while the new opportunities take front and center attention.

It wasn't "the economy" that got Motorola into desperate straits.  It was Apple's iPhone and Nokia's relentless new product introductions.  Without commensurate innovation, Motorola will never return to its former leadership position.  And without resources, that cannot happen.

By the way, thanks Carl Icahn.  You were the first to really push Motorola down this track of resource cutting.  You're efforts to push Motorola this direction worked, even if you didn't get to lead the cuts.  But the results are the same.  And if Motorola isn't careful, the whole company may disappear as both halves of what now remain continue declining.