by Adam Hartung | Sep 15, 2009 | Current Affairs, General, In the Whirlpool, Leadership, Lock-in
The Real Blindness Behind The Collapse
Adam Hartung,
09.14.09, 05:00 PM EDT
The exact same failing brought down Wall Street, Detroit and Main Street's real estate speculators.
"Too big to fail" is a new phrase in the American lexicon, born in the economic crisis that gave us a bankrupt Lehman Brothers and the shotgun marriage of Merrill Lynch with Bank of America.
Nobody really knows what it means, except that somehow in the banking
world, central bankers can decide that some institutions–like AIG, Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase and BofA–are so big they simply have to be kept alive.
This is the first paragraph in my latest column for Forbes. There is much EVERY business leader can learn from the collapse of Lehman. Learn about risk, and about how to succeed in a shifting marketplace. Please give the Forbes article a read – and put on a comment! Everybody enjoys reading what others think!
by Adam Hartung | Jul 20, 2009 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, eBooks, General, In the Whirlpool, Leadership, Lock-in
Years ago there was a TV ad featuring the actor Pauly Shore. Sitting in front of a haystack there was a sign over his frowning head reading "Find the needle." The voice over said "hard." Then another shot of Mr. Shore sitting in front of the same haystack grinning quite broadly, and the sign said "Find the hay." the voice over said "easy." Have you ever noticed that in business we too often try to do what's hard, rather than what's easy?
Take for example The New York Times Company, profiled today on Marketwatch.com in "The Gray Lady's Dilemma." The dilemma is apparently what the company will do next. Only, it really doesn't seem like much of a dilemma. The company is rapidly on its way to bankruptcy, with cash flow insufficient to cover operations. The leaders are negotiating with unions to lower costs, but it's unclear these cuts will be sufficient. And they definitely won't be within a year or two. Meanwhile the company is trying to sell The Boston Globe, which is highly unprofitable, and will most likely sell the Red Sox and the landmark Times Building in Manhattan, raising cash to keep the paper alive.
Only there isn't much of a dilemma here. Newspapers as they have historically been a business are no longer feasible. The costs outweigh the advertising and subscription dollars. The market is telling newspaper owners (Tribune Corporation, Gannett, McClatchey, News Corp. and all the others as well as The Times) that it has shifted. Cash flow and profits are a RESULT of the business model. People now are saying that they simply won't pay for newspapers – nor even read them. Thus advertisers have no reason to advertise. The results are terrible because the market has shifted. The easy thing to do is listen to the market. It's saying "stop." This should be easy. Quit, before you run out of money.
Of course, company leadership is Locked-in to doing what it always has done. So it doesn't want to stop. And many employees are Locked-in to their old job descriptions and pay – so they don't want to stop. They want to do what's hard – which is trying to Defend & Extend a money-losing enterprise after its useful life has been exhausted. But if customers have moved on, isn't this featherbedding? How is it different than trying to maintain coal shovelers on electric locomotives? This approach is hard. Very hard. And it won't succeed.
For a full half-decade, maybe longer, it has been crystal clear that print news, radio news and TV news (especially local) is worth a lot less than it used to be. They all suffer from one-way communication limits, poor reach and frequently poor latency. All problems that didn't exist before the internet. This technology and market shift has driven down revenues. People won't pay for what they can get globally, faster and in an interactive environment. As these customers shift, advertisers want to go where they are. After all, advertising is only valuable when it actually reaches someone.
Meanwhile, reporting and commentary increasingly is supplied by bloggers that work for free – or nearly so. Not unlike the "stringers" used by news services back in the "wire" days of Reuters, UPI and AP. Only now the stringers can take their news directly to the public without needing the wire service or publishers. They can blog their information and use Google to sell ads on their sites, thus directly making a market for their product. They even can push the product to consolidators like HuffingtonPost.com in order to maximize reach and revenue. Thus, the costs of acquiring and accumulating news has dropped dramatically. Increasingly, this pits the expensive journalist against the low cost journalist. And the market is shifting to the lower cost resource — regardless of how much people argue about the lack of quality (of course, some [such as politicians] would question the quality in today's "legitimate" media.)
Trying to keep The New York Times and Boston Globe alive as they have historically been is hard. I would contend a suicide effort. Continuing is explained only by recognizing the leaders are more interested in extending Lock-in than results. Because if they want results they would be full-bore putting all their energy into creating mixed-format content with maximum distribution that leads with the internet (including e-distribution like Kindle), and connects to TV, radio and print. Pricing for newspapers and magazines would jump dramatically in order to cover the much higher cost of printing. And the salespeople would be trained to sell cross-format ads which run in all formats. Audience numbers would cross all formats, and revenue would be tied to maximum reach, not the marginal value of each format. That is what advertisers want. Creating that sale, building that company, would be relatively much easier than trying to defend the Lock-in. And it would produce much better results.
The only dilemma at The New York Times Company is between dying as a newspaper company, or surviving as something else. The path it's on now says the management would rather die a newspaper company than do the smart thing and change to meet the market shift. For investors, this poses no dilemma. Investors would be foolhardy to be long the equity or bonds of The New York Times. There will be no GM-style bailout, and the current direction is into the Whirlpool. Employees had better be socking away cash for the inevitable pay cuts and layoffs. Suppliers better tighten up terms and watch the receivables. Because the company is in for a hard ending. And faster than anyone wants to admit.
Don't miss my recent ebook, "The Fall of GM" for a
quick read on how easily any company (even the nation's largest employer) can be
easily upset by market shifts. And learn what GM could have done to avoid
bankruptcy – lessons that can help your business grow!
http://tinyurl.com/mp5lrm
by Adam Hartung | May 29, 2009 | Current Affairs, In the Whirlpool, Leadership, Lifecycle
GM will file bankruptcy next week ("GM reaches swap deal, but bankruptcy still lies ahead" Marketwatch). It's likely historians will look back on this event as a major turning point in the change away from an industrial world (away from making money on "hard" assets like factories). GM was considered invincible. As were all the auto companies. The reorganizing of Ford, and bankruptcy of Chrysler will be remembered, but not likely with the impact of GM filing bankruptcy. Pick up any book on America post WWII and you'll find a discussion of General Motors. The quintessential industrial company. Destined to live forever due to its massive revenues and assets. After next week, history books will change. Altered by the previously unimaginable bankruptcy of GM. If "What's good for GM is good for America" is no longer true, what does it mean for America when GM declares Bankruptcy?
None of America's car companies will ever again be strong, vibrant auto companies. They are in the Whirlpook and can't get out. It's simply impossible. GM is now worth about $450million (at current prices of about $.80/share). It already owes the federal government $20billion – which is supposed to be converted to equity, with more equity owned by employees and converted bondholders. For most of the time since the 1970s, the average value of GM has been only $15billion (split adjusted average price $25). To again become viable GM wants the government to increase its investment to $60billion ("GM bondholders may recoup $14Billion" Marketwatch.com. That means for GM to ever be worth just the amount being supplied by the government bailout it would have to be worth $116/share – which is $20/share more than it was worth at its peak in the market blowout of 2000! (Chart here).
That means it is impossible to conceive of any way GM could ever be successful enough to achieve enough value as a car company to repay the government – and thus it has no future ability to provide dividends to private investors. Even though GM says it will be repositioned to be healthy, that simply is not true. It's no more healthy or attractive than Quasimodo, the hunchback of Notre Dame, could have ever hoped to be – or the elephant man. Helping them is charity, not a business proposition. When a company has no conceivable hope of making enough money to repay its investors it cannot attract management talent, or additional capital as assets wear out, and it eventually fails. It won't be long before the people running GM realize their future are as bureaucrats in a non-profit – but with far less psychic value than working at, for example, the Red Cross.
Meanwhile, Chrysler is downsizing dramatically as it looks for its way out of bankruptcy. As it tries to give the company to Italians to run, the company is dropping obligations it has carried for years. Even the venerable Lee Iacocca, who literally saved the company 20some years ago, will lose his pension and even his company car ("Iacocca losing pension, car in Chrysler bankruptcy" Reuters).
Ford, which restructured before this latest market shift, has not asked for bailout money. But its market share is dropping fast. Its vendors (including Visteon) are going bankrupt and Ford is guaranteeing their debt to keep them in business – with an open-ended cost not yet reflected in Ford's P&L. Even though it restructured, Ford's balance sheet is shot ("What About Ford?" 24/7 Wall Street). It has no money to design a new line of competitive vehicles.
None of these 3 companies have the wherewithal as operating businesses to replace assets. And they are competing with Japanese, Korean and Indian companies that have lower operating costs, lower fixed asset investments, higher quality and newer product lines, better customer satisfaction rates, higher profits and stronger balance sheets. Without competition it's hard to expect America's car companies to do well. When you look at competitors you realize this game can still have several more moves (especially with market intervention by government players with public policy objectives) – but the end is predicatable. Only for reasons of public policy, rather than business investment, would you continue to fund any of these American competitors.
Even though the switch from an industrial economy to an information economy began in the 1990s, historians will likely link the switch to June, 2009. (I guess that's fair, since the shift from an agrarian economy to an industrial economy began in the 1920s but wasn't recognized until the late 1940s.) Just as GM was the company that epitomized the success of industial business models, it will be the company that becomes the icon for the end of industrial models. It failed much faster, and worse, than anyone expected.
If "What's good for GM" (as in the government bailout) isn't good for America any longer – what is? For many people, this is shift is conceptually easy to understand – but hard to do anything about. They don't know what to do next; what to do differently. They fully expect to continue focusing on balance sheets and assets and the tools we used to analyze industrial companies. And those people will see their money drift away. Just like you can't make decent returns farming in a post-agrarian economy, you won't be able to make money on assets in a post-industrial economy. From here on, it's all about the information value and learning how to maximize it. It's not about old-style execution, its about adaptability to rapidly shifting markets built on information.
Let's consider CDW – a 1990s marvel of growth shipping computers to businsesses around America. CDW has pushed hardware and software onto its customers for 2 decades in its chase with Dell. But every year, making money as a push distributor gets harder and harder. And that's because buyers have so many different sources for products that the value of the salesperson/distributor keeps declining. Finding the product, the product info, inventory, low shipping and low price is now very easily accomplished with a PC on the web. Every year you need CDW less and less. Just like we've seen distributors squeezed out of travel we're seeing them squeezed out of industry after industry – including computer componentry. If CDW keeps thinking of itself as a "
;push" company selling products – a very industrial view of its business – it's future profitability is highly jeapardized.
The market has shifted. For CDW to have high value it must find value in the value of the information in its business. Perhaps like the Chicago Mercantile Exchange they could create and trade futures contracts on the value of storage, computing capacity or some other business commodity. The information about their products – production, inventory and consumption – being more profitable than the products themselves (everyone knows more profit is made by Merc commodity traders than all the farmers in America combined). Or CDW needs to develop extensive databases on their customers' behaviors so they can supply them with new things (services or products) before they even realize they need them — sort of like how Google has all those searches stored on computers so they can predict the behavior of you, or a group your identified with, before you even type an internet command. CDW's value as a box pusher is dropping fast. In the future CDW will have to be a lot smarter about the information surrounding products, services and customers if it wants to make money.
A lot of people are very uncomfortable these days. Since the 1990s, markets keep shifting fast – and hard. Nothing seems to stay the same very long. Those trying to follow 1980s business strategy keep trying to find some rock to cling to – some way to build an industrial-era entry barrier to protect themselves from competition. They try using financial statements, which are geared around assets, to run the business. Their uncomfortableness will not diminish, because their approach is hopelessly out of date. GM knew those tools better than anyone – and we can see how that worked out for them.
To regain control of your future you have to recognize that the base of the pyramid has shifted. How we once made money won't work any more. Value doesn't grow from just owning, holding and operating assets. Maximizing utility of assets will not produce high rates of return. We are now in a new economy. One where outdated distribution systems (like the auto dealer structure) simply get in the way of success. One where a focus on the product, rather than its use or customer, won't make high rates of return. With the bankruptcy of GM reliance on the old business model must now be declared over. We've entered the Google age (for lack of a better icon) – and it affects every business and manager in the world.
The future requires companies focus on markets, shifts and adaptable organizations. Successful businesses must have good market sensing systems, rather than rely on powerful six sigma internal quality programs. They have to know their competitors even better than they know customers to deal with rapid changes in market moves. They have to be willing to become what the market needs – not what they want to define as a core competency. They have to accept Disruptions as normal – not something to avoid. And they have to use White Space to learn how to be what they are not, so they remain vital as markets shift. So they can quickly evolve to the next source of value creation.
by Adam Hartung | May 7, 2009 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Swamp, Leadership, Lock-in
Good public policy and good management don't always align. And the banking crisis is a good example. We now hear "Banks must raise $75billion" if they are to be prepared for ongoing write-downs in a struggling economy. This is after all the billions already loaned to keep them afloat the last year.
But the bankers are claiming they will have no problem raising this money as reported in "The rush to raise Capital." "AIG narrows loss" tells how one of the primary contributors to the banking crisis now thinks it will survive. And as a result of this news, "Bank shares largely higher" is another headline reporting how financial stocks surged today post-announcements.
So regulators are feeling better. They won't have to pony up as much money as they might have. And politicians feel better, hoping that the bank crisis is over. And a lot of businesses feel better, hearing that the banks which they've long worked with, and are important to their operations, won't be going under. Generally, this is all considered good news. Especially for those worried about how a soft economy was teetering on the brink of getting even worse.
But the problem is we've just extended the life of some pretty seriously ill patients that will probably continue their bad practices. The bail out probably saved America, and the world, from an economic calamity that would have pushed millions more into unemployment and exacerbated falling asset values. A global "Great Depression II" would have plunged millions of working poor into horrible circumstances, and dramatically damaged the ability of many blue and white collar workers in developed countries to maintain their homes. It would have been a calamity.
But this all happened because of bad practices on the part of most of these financial institutions. They pushed their Success Formulas beyond their capabilities, causing failure. Only because of the bailout were these organizations, and their unhealthy Success Formulas saved. And that sows the seeds of the next problem. In evolution, when your Success Formula fails due to an environomental shift you are wiped out. To be replaced by a stronger, more adaptable and better suited competitor. Thus, evolution allows those who are best suited to thrive while weeding out the less well suited. But, the bailout just kept a set of very weak competitors alive – disallowing a change to stronger and better competitors.
These bailed out banks will continue forward mostly as they behaved in the past. And thus we can expect them to continue to do poorly at servicing "main street" while trying to create risk pass through products that largely create fees rather than economic growth. These banks that led the economic plunge are now repositioned to be ongoing leaders. Which almost assures a continuing weak economy. Newly "saved" from failure, they will Defend & Extend their old Success Formula in the name of "conservative management" when in fact they will perpetuate the behavior that put money into the wrong places and kept money from where it would be most productive.
Free market economists have long discussed how markets have no "brakes". They move to excess before violently reacting. Like a swing that goes all one direction until violently turning the opposite direction. Leaving those at the top and bottom with very upset stomachs and dramatic vertigo. The only way to avert the excessive tops is market intervention – which is what the government bail-out was. It intervened in a process that would have wiped out most of the largest U.S. banks. But, in the wake of that intervention we're left with, well, those same U.S. banks. And mostly the same leaders.
What's needed now are Disruptions inside these banks which will force a change in their Success Formula. This includes leadership changes, like the ousting of Bank of America's Chairman/CEO. But it takes more than changing one man, and more than one bank. It takes Disruption across the industry which will force it to change. Force it to open White Space in which it redefines the Success Formula to meet the needs of a shifted market – which almost pushed them over the edge – before those same shifts do crush the banks and the economy.
And that is now going to be up to the regulators. The poor Secretary of Treasury is already eyeball deep in complaints about his policies and practices. I'm sure he'd love to stand back and avoid more controversy. But, unless the regulatory apparatus now pushes those leading these banks to behave differently, to Disrupt and implement White Space to redefine their value for a changed marketplace, we can expect a protracted period of bickering and very weak returns for these banks. We can expect them to walk a line of ups and downs, but with returns that overall are neutral to declining. And that they will stand in the way of newer competitors who have a better approach to global banking from taking the lead.
So, if you didn't like government intervention to save the banks – you're really going to hate the government intervention intended to change how they operate. If you are glad the government intervened, then you'll find yourself arguing about why the regulators are just doing what they must do in order to get the banks, and the economy, operating the way it needs to in a shifted, information age.
