Verizon’s AOL/Yahoo Debacle – Think You Can Fix That?

Verizon’s AOL/Yahoo Debacle – Think You Can Fix That?

Do you have any idea how powerful AOL and Yahoo once were, and how much they were once worth? Do you know how much shareholder value has been destroyed in these 2 companies in just 20 years? $221 Billion of destroyed wealth.

AOL pioneered the web as we know it today. Long before wireless, or broadband, there was “dial up service.” For young readers, that meant using a physical modem to connect your computer to a land-line telephone in order to literally dial up a connection to an internet service provider. AOL pioneered using the internet, and was the #1 connection with almost the entire marketplace. The phrase that made AOL famous back then was when you connected to AOL and it gave us the now iconic “You’ve got mail.” After connecting America, in 2000 AOL merged with Time Warner media in a deal valuing AOL at $111B.

Yahoo pioneered giving internet users news. It accumulated news from around the world on Sports, Economy and many other topics, making the news available to readers for free because it sold ads to pay the bills. In 2000 a publicly traded Yahoo was valued at $125B.

So in 2000, amidst a very extended NASDAQ internet hype, AOL and Yahoo were valued at $226B.

Image Source

This week Verizon agreed to sell the two companies to a private equity firm for $5B. That’s a loss in value of $221B in 21 years.

How does a loss of this magnitude happen? A lot of focusing on tactics, ignoring market trends and failing to adapt the company strategy to meet changing competitive dynamics. Broadband and wireless eventually made dial-up irrelevant. And despite buying some media company to try and add new content to AOL, it lost all meaning. Time Warner spun it out to the public at a value of $3.5B in 2009.

Then, Verizon thought it could build a proprietary content company to get more Verizon customers so it bought AOL in 2015 for $4.4B. Only, nobody needed another content provider by then. Google served up general content just fine, Facebook gave us content we looked at frequently, and specialized content sites like Finance (Marketwatch) and Sports (ESPN) made it impossible that late in the game to launch a general purpose content accumulator and reposter. It was a strategy for 2005, not 2015. Meanwhile, Yahoo made one tactical decision after another to shore up its old model that didn’t work. Google became vastly better at search, and vastly better at delivering content. Tactical oriented CEOs Carol Bartz and Marissa Mayer had no strategy to meet emerging needs of the 2010 decade and beyond – leading Yahoo into complete irrelevancy.

Undeterred, the Verizon owned AOL bought Yahoo in 2017 for $4.5B. After all, it seemed cheap compared to its once $125B value – right? The idea was to merge the two companies, create “cost synergies” and “scale” in users to sell more advertising. Only, neither platform had enough original content to stop the user bleed to other sites. Netflix and Google’s YouTube took everyone who wanted new content away, and there was nothing left for AOL/Yahoo to deliver. It became the internal combustion engine repair shop in a world full of EVs

Now, after spending $9.9B on the entities plus much more in acquisitions, Verizon is selling both entities to Apollo Global Management private equity for $5B – a loss of $4.4B. And Apollo thinks this is a good deal because “a high tide raises all boats” and it will win merely because the world is increasingly using the internet. Really? More people are using the web, and more often, but they’ve already shown not via AOL nor Yahoo. Facebook, Instagram, Google, Pinterest, Twitter, and a raft of other sites are gaining the traffic. What was once irrelevant remains irrelevant.

It is crucial to understand why these to GIANTS of the internet are now part of history’s dustbin. While they pioneered the market, gaining huge revenues, share and valuation, they did NOT keep their eyes on disruptive innovators who could change the market they pioneered. Broadband killed dial-up, and because AOL moved too late it died. Google overtook search, delivering more content faster and better, and Yahoo simply waited too long to react. Not unlike how Research in Motion (Blackberry) failed to see the “app wave” in mobile coming and lost its enormous lead in mobile phones to Apple and Samsung. All thought their strength in pioneering was enough – and failed to keep their eyes on external trends and new market shifts that would change competition.

I wrote a raft of columns about the mistakes made by these company CEOs from 2009 through 2017 – constantly telling readers not to buy the stocks (just search the blogs my website adamhartung.com for AOL or Yahoo.) It is extremely rare for a corporation locked into its business model and cost cutting to adjust to a rapidly shifting market. When a company does so – like Jobs turned around Apple and Nadella at Microsoft – it is the exception to be well applauded. But that is very, very rare.

And this is NOT what PE companies do. They aren’t visionary investors who put in lots of money to change companies. They cut costs, streamline operations, and add debt to get their investment back. Apollo is no different. It has no vision of the internet future that will slow Facebook, Apple, Netflix, Alphabet/Google or even Amazon. It has purchased two irrelevant brands with outdated business models, no new technology, no new market approaches and no new insight to future unmet needs. There is no doubt Apollo will not turn these around. Apollo will unload this newest Yahoo! over-leveraged to a public debt market dominated by pension funds and it will soon enough file bankruptcy, finishing the coffin.

Do you think you could turn these around? First, are you ready to turn around your own business? Are you focused on how market shifts, happening today, will change your market? Are you seeing trends, and changing your business model and technology to adjust? Are you building a business around future scenarios you’ve created to compete in 2025 and beyond with different competitors offering different solutions? Or are you relying on past strengths to carry you through the future? If you’re planning with your eyes firmly in the rear view mirror I highly recommend you learn the lesson from AOL and Yahoo – that approach will not work.


Do you know your Value Proposition? Can you clearly state that Value Proposition without any linkage to your Value Delivery System? If not, you better get on that pretty fast. Otherwise, you’re very likely to end up like encyclopedias and newspaper companies. Or you’ll develop a neat technology that’s the next Segway. It’s always know your customer and their needs first, then create the solution. Don’t be a solution looking for an application. Hopefully Uber and Aurora will both now start heading in the right directions.

Don’t Miss Adam’s Recent Podcasts!

Did you see the trends, and were you expecting the changes that would happen to your demand? It IS possible to use trends to make good forecasts, and prepare for big market shifts. If you don’t have time to do it, perhaps you should contact us, Spark Partners.  We track hundreds of trends, and are experts at developing scenarios applied to your business to help you make better decisions.

TRENDS MATTER. If you align with trends your business can do GREAT! Are you aligned with trends? What are the threats and opportunities in your strategy and markets? Do you need an outsider to assess what you don’t know you don’t know? You’ll be surprised how valuable an inexpensive assessment can be for your future business.  Click for Assessment info. Or, to keep up on trends, subscribe to our weekly podcasts and posts on trends and how they will affect the world of business at www.SparkPartners.com

Give us a call or send an email.  Adam@sparkpartners.com 847-726-8465.

The 4 Reasons Verizon Should Buy Yahoo

The 4 Reasons Verizon Should Buy Yahoo

Verizon tipped its hand that it would be interested to buy Yahoo back in December.  In the last few days this possibility drew more attention as Verizon’s CFO confirmed interest on CNBC, and Bloomberg reported that AOL’s CEO Tim Armstrong is investigating a potential acquisition.  There are some very good reasons this deal makes sense:

AOLHooFirst, this acquisition has the opportunity to make Verizon distinctive.  Think about all those ads you see for mobile phone service.  Pretty much alike.  All of them  trying to say that their service is better than competitors, in a world where customers don’t see any real difference.  3G, 4G – pretty soon it feels like they’ll be talking about 10G – but users mostly don’t care.  The service is usually good enough, and all competitors seem the same.

So, that leads to the second element they advertise – price.  How many different price programs can anyone invent?  And how many phone or tablet give-aways.  What is clear is that the competition is about price.  And that means the product has become generic.  And when products are generic, and price is the #1 discussion, it leads to low margins and lousy investor returns.

But a Yahoo acquisition would make Verizon differentiated.  Verizon could offer its own unique programming, at a meaningful level, and make it available only on their network.  And this could offer price advantages.  Like with Go90 streaming, Verizon customers could have free downloads of Verizon content, while having to pay data fees for downloads from other sites like YouTube, Facebook, Vine, Instagram, Amazon Prime, etc.  The Verizon customer could have a unique experience, and this could allow Verizon to move away from generic selling and potentially capture higher margins as a differentiated competitor.

Second, Yahoo will never be a lead competitor and has more value as a supporting player.  Yahoo has lost its lead in every major competitive market, and it will never catch up.  Google is #1 in search, and always will be.  Google is #1 in video, with Facebook #2, and Yahoo will never catch either.  Ad sales are now dominated by adwords and social media ads – and Yahoo is increasingly an afterthought.  Yahoo’s relevance in digital advertising is at risk, and as a weak competitor it could easily disappear.

But, Verizon doesn’t need the #1 player to put together a bundled solution where the #2 is a big improvement from nothing.  By integrating Yahoo services and capabilities into its  unique platform Verizon could take something that will never be #1 and make it important as part of a new bundle to users and advertisers.  As supporting technology and products Yahoo is worth quite a bit more to Verizon than it will ever be as an independent competitor to investors – who likely cannot keep up the investment rates necessary to keep Yahoo alive.

Third, Yahoo is incredibly cheap.  For about a year Yahoo investors have put no value on the independent Yahoo.  The company’s value has been only its stake in Alibaba.  So investors inherently have said they would take nothing for the traditional “core” Yahoo assets.

Additionally, Yahoo investors are stuck trying to capture the Alibaba value currently locked-up in Yahoo.  If they try to spin out or sell the stake then a $10-12Billion tax bill likely kicks in.  By getting rid of Yahoo’s outdated business what’s left is “YaBaba” as a tracking stock on the NASDAQ for the Chinese Alibaba shares.  Or, possibly Alibaba buys the remaining “YaBaba” shares, putting cash into the shareholder pockets — or giving them Alibaba shares which they may  prefer.  Etiher way, the tax bill is avoided and the Alibaba value is unlocked.  And that is worth considerably more than Yahoo’s “core” business.

So it is highly unlikely a deal is made for free.  But lacking another likely buyer Verizon is in a good position to buy these assets for a pretty low value.  And that gives them the opportunity to turn those assets into something worth quite a lot more without the overhang of huge goodwill charges left over from buying an overpriced asset – as usually happens in tech.

Fourth, Yahoo finally gets rid of an ineffectual Board and leadership team.  The company’s Board has been trying to find a successful leader since the day it hired Carol Bartz.  A string of CEOs have been unable to define a competitive positioning that works for Yahoo, leading to the current lack of investor enthusiasm.

The current CEO Mayer and her team, after months of accomplishing nothing to improve Yahoo’s competitiveness and growth prospects, is now out of ideas.  Management consulting firm McKinsey & Company has been brought in to engineer yet another turnaround effort.  Last week we learned there will be more layoffs and business closings as Yahoo again cannot find any growth prospects.  This was the turnaround that didn’t, and now additional value destruction is brought on by weak leadership.

Most of the time when leaders fail the company fails.  Yahoo is interesting because there is a way to capture value from what is currently a failing situation.  Due to dramatic value declines over the last few years, most long-term investors have thrown in the towel.  Now the remaining owners are very short-term, oriented on capturing the most they can from the Alibaba holdings.  They are happy to be rid of what the company once was.  Additionally, there is a possible buyer who is uniquely positioned to actually take those second-tier assets and create value out of them, and has the resources to acquire the assets and make something of them.  A real “win/win” is now possible.

 

Is Yahoo Doomed?  Probably

Is Yahoo Doomed? Probably

Marissa Mayer’s reign as head of Yahoo looks to be ending like her predecessors.  With a serious flop.  Only this may well be the last flop – and the end of the internet pioneer.

It didn’t have to happen this way, but an inability to manage Status Quo Risk doomed Ms. Mayer’s leadership – as it has too many others.  And once again bad leadership will see a lot of people – investors, employees and even customers – pay the price.

Yahoo was in big trouble when Ms. Mayer arrived.  Growth had stalled, and its market was being chopped up by Google and Facebook.  It’s very relevancy was questionable as people no longer needed news consolidation sites – which had ended AOL, for example – and search had long gone to Google.  The intense internet users were already clearly mobile social media fans, and Yahoo simply did not compete in that space.

In other words, Yahoo desperately needed a change of direction and an entirely new strategy the day Ms. Mayer showed up.  Only, unfortunately, she didn’t provide either.  Instead Ms. Meyer offered, at best, a series of fairly meaningless tactical actions.  Changing Yahoo’s home page layout, cancelling the company’s work-from-home policy and hiring Katie Couric, amidst a string of small and meaningless acquisitions, were the business equivalent of fiddling while Rome burned.  Tinkering with the tactics of an outdated success formula simply ignored the fact that Yahoo was already well on the road to irrelevancy and needed to change, dramatically, quickly.

The saving grace for Yahoo was when Alibaba went public.  Suddenly a long-ago decision to invest in the Chinese company created a vast valuation increase for Yahoo.  This was the opportunity of a lifetime to shift the business fast and hard into something new, different and much more relevant than the worn out Yahoo strategy.  But, unfortunately, Ms. Mayer used this as a curtain to hide the crumbling former internet leader.  She did nothing to make Yahoo relevant, as fights erupted over how to carve up the Alibaba windfall.

When it became public that Ms. Mayer had hired famed strategy firm McKinsey & Co. to decide what businesses to close in its next “restructuring” it lit up the internet with cries to possibly just get rid of the whole thing! After 3 years, and more than one layoff, it now appears that Ms. Mayer has no better idea for creating value out of Yahoo than doing another big layoff to, once again, improve “focus on core offerings.”  Additional layoffs, after 3 years of declining sales, is not the way to grow and increase shareholder value.

Analysts are pointing out that Yahoo’s core business today is valueless.  The company is valued at less than its remaining Alibaba stake.  And this is not outrageous, since in the ad world Yahoo has become close to irrelevant.  Nobody would build an on-line ad campaign ignoring Google or Facebook, and several other internet leaders.  But ignoring Yahoo as a media option is increasingly common.

Investors are rightly worried that the IRS will take much of the remaining Alibaba value as taxes in any spinoff, leaving them with far less money.  Giving up on the CEO, and its increasingly irrelevant “core business” they are asking if it wouldn’t be smarter to sell what we think of as Yahoo to Softbank so the Japanese company can obtain the rest of Yahoo Japan it does not already own.  Ostensibly then Yahoo as it is known in the USA could simply start to disappear – like AOL and all the other on-line news consolidators.

PirateMarissaMayerIt really did not have to happen this way.  Yahoo’s troubles were clearly visible, and addressable.  But CEO Mayer simply chose to keep doing more of the same, making small improvements to Yahoo’s site and search tool.  By keeping Yahoo aligned with its historical Status Quo risk of irrelevance, obsolescence and failure grew quarter-by-quarter.

Now Status Quo Risk (the risk created by not adapting to shifting market needs) has most likely doomed Yahoo.  Investors are no longer interested in waiting for a turn-around.  They want their Alibaba valuation, and they could care less about Yahoo’s CEO, employees or customers.  Many have given up on Ms. Mayer, and simply want an exit strategy so they can move on.

Ms. Mayer’s leadership has shown us some important leadership lessons:

  • Hiring an executive from Google (or another tech company) does not magically mean success will emerge.  Like Ron Johnson from Apple to JCP, Ms. Mayer showed that even tech execs often lack an ability to understand market trends and the skills to adapt an organization.
  • It is incredibly easy for a new leader to buy into an historical success formula and keep tweaking it, rather than doing the hard work of creating a new strategy and adapting.  The lure of focusing on tactics and hoping the strategy will take care of itself is remarkably easy fall into.  But investors need to realize that tactics do not fix an outdated success formula.
  • Youth is not the answer.  Ms. Mayer was young, and identified with the youthfulness of Google and internet users.  But, in the end, she woefully lacked the strategy and leadership skills necessary to turn around the deeply troubled Yahoo.  Young, new and fresh is no substitute for critical thinking and knowing how to lead.
  • Boards give CEOs too much time to fail.  It was clear within months Ms. Mayer had no strategy for making Yahoo relevant.  Yet, the Board did not recognize its mistake and replace the CEOs.  There still are not sufficient safeguards to make sure Boards act when CEOs fail to lead effectively.
  • CEOs too often have too much hubris.  Ms. Mayer went from college to a rapid career acceleration in largely staff positions to CEO of Yahoo and a Board member of Wal-Mart.  It is easy to develop hubris, and an over-abundance of self-confidence.  Then it is easy to require your staff agree with you, and pledge so support you (as Ms. Mayer recently did.)  All of this indicates a leader running on hubris rather than critical thinking, open discourse and effective decision-making.  Hubris is not just a weakness of white male leaders.

Could there have been a different outcome.  Of course.  But for Yahoo’s employees, suppliers, customers and investors the company hired a string of CEOs that simply were not up to the job of redirecting the company into competitiveness.  Each one fell victim to trying to maintain the Status Quo. And, unfortunately, Ms. Mayer will be seen as the most recent – and possibly last – CEO to lead Yahoo into failure.  Ms. Mayer simply was not up to the job – and now a lot of people will pay the price.

 

Be Really Glad Bezos Bought The Washington Post

Jeff Bezos, founder of Amazon worth $25.2B just paid $250 million to become sole owner of The Washington Post

Some think the recent rash of of billionaires buying newspapers is simply rich folks buying themselves trophies.  Probably true in some instances – and that benefits no one.  Just look at how Sam Zell ruined The Chicago Tribune and Los Angeles Times.  Or Rupert Murdoch's less than stellar performance owning The Wall Street Journal.  It's hard to be excited about a financially astute commodities manager, like John Henry, buying The Boston Globe – as it has all the earmarks of someone simply jumping in where angels fear to tread.

These companies lost their way long ago.  For decades they defined themselves as newspaper companies.  They linked everything about what they did to printing a daily paper.  The service they provided, which was a mix of hard news and entertainment reporting, was lost in the productization of that service into a print deliverable. 

So when people started to look for news and entertainment on-line, these companies chose to ignore the trend.  They continued to believe that readers would always want the product – the paper – rather than the service. And they allowed themselves to remain fixated on old processes and outdated business models long after the market shifted.

The leaders ignored the fact that advertisers could obtain much more directed placement at targets, at far lower cost, on-line than through the broad-based, general ads placed in newspapers.  And that consumers could get a much faster, and cheaper, sale via eBay, CraigsList or Vehix.com than via overpriced classified ads. 

Newspaper leadership kept trying to defend their "core" business of collecting news for daily publication in a paper format.  They kept trying to defend their local advertising base.  Even though every month more people abandoned them for an on-line format.  Not one major newspaper headmast made a strong commitment to go on-line.  None tried to be #1 in news dissemination via the web, or take a leadership role in associating ad placement with news and entertainment. 

They could have addressed the market shift, and changed their approach and delivery.  But they did not.

Money manager Mr. Henry has done a good job of turning the Boston Red Sox into a profitable institution.  But there is nothing in common between the Red Sox, for which you can grow the fan base, bring people to the ballpark and sell viewing rights, and The Boston Globe.  The former is unique.  The latter is obsolete.  Yes, the New York Times company paid $1.1B for the Globe in 1993, but that doesn't mean it's worth $70M today.  Given its revenue and cost structure, as a newspaper it is probably worth nothing.

But, we all still want news.  Nobody wants the information infrastructure collecting what we need to know to crumble.  Nobody wants journalism to die.  But it is unreasonable to expect business people to keep investing in newspapers just to fulfill a public good.  Even Mr. Zell abandoned that idea. 

Thus, we need the news, as a service, to be transformed into a new, profitable enterprise.  Somehow these organizations have to abandon the old ways of doing things, including print and paper distribution, and transform to meet modern needs.  The 6 year revenue slide at Washington Post has to stop, and instead of thinking about survival company leadership needs to focus on how to thrive with a new, profitable business model.

And that's why we all should be glad Jeff Bezos bought The Washington Post.  As head of Amazon.com  The Harvard Business Review ranked him the second best performing CEO of the last decadeCNNMoney.com named him Business Person of the Year 2012, and called him "the ultimate disruptor."

By not doing what everyone else did, breaking all the rules of traditional retail, Mr. Bezos built Amazon.com into a $61B general merchandise retailer in 20 years.  When publishers refused to create electronic books he led Amazon into competing with its suppliers by becoming a publisher.  When Microsoft wouldn't produce an e-reader, retailer and publisher Amazon.com jumped into the intensely competitive world of personal electroncs creating and launching Kindle.  And then upped the stakes against competitors by enhancing that into Kindle Fire.  And when traditional IT suppliers like HP and Dell were slow to help small (or any) business move toward cloud computing Amazon launched its own network services to help the market shift.

Mr. Bezos' language regarding his intentions post acquisition are quite telling, "change… is essential… with or without new ownership….need to invent…need to experiment." 

And that is exactly what the news industry needs today.  Today's leaders are HuffingtonPost.com, Marketwatch.com and other web sites with wildly different business models than traditional paper media.  WaPo success will require transforming a dying company, tied to an old success formula, into a trend-aligned organization that give people what they want, when they want it, at a profit.

And it's hard to think of someone better experienced, or skilled, than Jeff Bezos to provide that kind of leadership.  With just a little imagination we can imagine some rapid moves:

  • distribution of all content via Kindle style eReaders, rather than print.  Along with dramatically increasing the cost of paper subscriptions and daily paper delivery
  • Instead of a "one size fits all" general purpose daily paper, packaging news into more fitting targeted products.  Sports stories on sports sites.  Business stories on business sites.  Deeper, longer stories into ebooks available for $.99 purchase.  And repackaging of stories that cover longer time spans into electronic short-books for purchase.
  • Packaging content into Facebook locations for targeted readers.  Tying ads into these social media sites, and promoting ad sales for small, local businesses to the Facebook sites.
  • Or creating an ala carte approach to buying various news and entertainment in an iTunes or Netflix style environment (or on those sites)
  • Robustly attracting readers via connecting content with social media, including Twitter, to meet modern needs for immediacy, headline knowledge and links to deeper stories — with sales of ads onto social media
  • Tying electronic coupons, and buy-it-now capabilities to ads linked to appropriate content
  • Retargeting advertising sales from general purpose to targeted delivery at specific readers, with robust packages of on-line coupons, links to specials and fast, impulse purchase capability
  • Increased use of bloggers and ad hoc writers to supplement staff in order to offer opinions and insights quickly, but at lower cost.
  • Changes in compensation linked to page views and readership, just as revenue is linked to same.

We've watched a raft of newspapers and magazines disappear. This has not been a failure of journalism, but rather a failure of business leaders to address shifting markets and transform old organizations to meet modern needs.  It's not a quality problem, but rather a failure of strategy to adapt to shifting markets.  And that's a lesson every business leaders needs to note, because today, as I wrote in April, 2012, every company has to behave like a tech company!

Doing more of the same, cutting costs and rich egos won't fix a newspaper.  Only the willingness to experiment and find new solutions which transform these organizations into something very different, well beyond print, will work.  Let's hope Mr. Bezos brings the same zest for addressing these challenges and aligning with market needs he brought to Amazon.  To a large extent, the future of news and "freedom of the press" may well depend upon it.

 

The Day TV Died – Winners and Losers (Comcast, Disney, CBS)

Remember when almost everyone read a daily newspaper

Newspaper readership peaked around 2000.  Since then printed media has declined, as readers shifted on-line.  Magazines have folded, and newspapers have disappeared, quit printing, dramatically cut page numbers and even more dramatically cut staff. 

Amazingly, almost no major print publisher prepared for this, even though the trend was becoming clear in the late 1990s. 

Newspapers are no longer a viable business.  While industry revenue grew for
almost 2 centuries, it collapsed in a mere decade.

Newspaper ad spending 1950-2010
Chart Source: BusinessInsider.com

This market shift created clear winners, and losers.  On-line news sites like Marketwatch and HuffingtonPost were clear winners.  Losers were traditional newspaper companies such as Tribune Corporation, Gannett, McClatchey, Dow Jones and even the New York Times Company.  And investors in these companies either saw their values soar, or practically disintegrate. 

In 2012 it is equally clear that television is on the brink of a major transition.  Fewer people are content to have their entertainment programmed for them when they can program it themselves on-line.  Even though the number of television channels has exploded with pervasive cable access, the time spent watching television is not growing.  While simultaneously the amount of time people spend looking at mobile internet displays (tablets, smartphones and laptops) is growing at double digit rates.

Web v mobile v TV consumption
Chart Source: Silicone Alley Insider Chart of the Day 12/5/12

It would be easy to act like newspaper defenders and pretend that television as we've known it will not change.  But that would be, at best, naive.  Just look around at broadband access, the use of mobile devices, the convenience of mobile and the number of people that don't even watch traditional TV any more (especially younger people) and the trend is clear.  One-way preprogrammed advertising laden television is not a sustainable business. 

So, now is the time to prepare.  And change your business to align with impending new realities.

Losers, and winners, will be varied – and not entirely obvious.  Firstly, a look at those trying to maintain the status quo, and likely to lose the most.

Giant consumer goods and retail companies benefitted from the domination of television.  Only huge companies like P&G, Kraft, GM and Target could afford to lay out billions of dollars for television ads to build, and defend, a brand.  But what advantage will they have when TV budgets no longer control brand building?  They will become extremely vulnerable to more innovative companies that have better products and move on fast lifecycles. Their size, hierarchy and arcane business practices will lead to huge problems.  Imagine a raft of new Hostess Brands experiences.

Even as the trends have started changing these companies have continued pumping billions into the traditional TV networks as they spend to defend their brand position.  This has driven up the value of companies like CBS, Comcast (owns NBC) and Disney (owns ABC) over the last 3 years substantially. But don't expect that to last forever. Or even a few more years.

Just like newspaper ad spending fell off a cliff when it was clear the eyeballs were no longer there, expect the same for television ad spending.  As giant advertisers find the cost of television harder and harder to justify their outlays will eventually take the kind of cliff dive observed in the chart (above) for newspaper advertising.  Already some consumer goods and ad agency executives are alluding to the fact that the rate of return on traditional TV is becoming sketchy.

So far, we've seen little at the companies which own TV networks to demonstrate they are prepared for the floor to fall out of their revenue stream.  While some have positions in a few internet production and delivery companies, most are clearly still doing their best to defend & extend the old business – just like newspaper owners did.  Just as newspapers never found a way to replace the print ad dollars, these television companies look very much like businesses that have no apparent solution for future growth.  I would not want my 401K invested in any major network company.

And there will be winners.

For smaller businesses, there has never been a better time to compete.  A company as small as Tesla or Fisker can now create a brand on-line at a fraction of the old cost.  And that brand can be as powerful as Ford, and potentially a lot more trendy. There are very low entry barriers for on-line brand building using not only ad words and web page display ads, but also using social media to build loyal followers who use and promote a brand.  What was once considered a niche can become well known almost overnight simply by applying the new dynamics of reaching customers on-line, and increasingly via mobile.  Look at the success of Toms Shoes.

Zappos and Amazon have shown that with almost no television ads they can create powerhouse retail brands.  The new retailers do not compete just on price, but are able to offer selection, availability and customer service at levels unachievable by traditional brick-and-mortar retailers.  They can suggest products and prices of things you're likely to need, even before you realize you need them.  They can educate better, and faster, than most retail store employees.  And they can offer great prices due to less overhead, along with the convenience of shipping the product right into your home. 

And as people quit watching preprogrammed TV, where will they go for content?  Anybody streaming will have an advantage – so think Netflix (which recently contracted for all the Disney content,) Amazon, Pandora, Spotify and even AOL.  But, this will also benefit those companies providing content access such as Apple TV, Google TV, YouTube (owned by Google) to offer content channels and the increasingly omnipresent Facebook will deliver up not only friends, but content — and ads. 

As for content creation, the deep pockets of traditional TV production companies will likely disappear along with their ability to control distribution.  That means fewer big-budget productions as risk goes up without revenue assurances. 

But that means even more ability for newer, smaller companies to create competitive content seeking audiences.  Where once a very clever, hard working Seth McFarlane (creator of Family Guy) had to hardscrabble with networks to achieve distribution, and live in fear of a single person controlling his destiny, in the future these creative people will be able to own their content and capture the value directly as they build a direct audience.  A phenomenon like George Lucas will be more achievable than ever before as what might look like chaos during transition will migrate to a much more competitive world where audiences, rather than network executives, will decide what content wins – and loses.

So, with due respects to Don McLean, will today be the day TV Died?  We will only know in historical context.  Nobody predicted newspapers had peaked in 2000, but it was clear the internet was changing news consumption behavior.  And we don't know if TV viewership will begin its rapid decline in 2013, or in a couple more years. But the inevitable change is clear – we just don't know exactly when.

So it would be foolish to not think that the industry is going to change dramatically.  And the impact on advertising will be even more profound, much more profound, than it was in print.  And that will have an even more profound impact on American society – and how business is done. 

What are you doing to prepare?