by Adam Hartung | Oct 9, 2013 | Current Affairs, In the Rapids, Innovation, Lifecycle
In 1985 there was universal agreement that investors should
be heavily in pharmaceuticals.
Companies like Merck, Eli Lilly, Pfizer, Sanofi, Roche, Glaxo and Abbott
were touted as the surest route to high portfolio returns.
Today, not so much.
Merck, once a leader in antibiotics, is laying off 20% of
its staff. Half in R&D; the
lifeblood of future products and profits.
Lilly is undertaking
another round of 2013 cost cuts. Over
the last year about 100,000 jobs have been eliminated in big pharma companies,
which have implemented spin-outs and split-ups as well as RIFs.
What happened? In the old days pharma companies had to demonstrate
their drug worked; called product efficacy. It did not have to be better than existing drugs. If the drug worked, without big safety
issues, the company could launch it.
Then the business folks took over with ads, distribution,
salespeople and convention booths, convincing doctors to prescribe and us to
buy.
Big pharma companies grew into large, masterful consumer
products companies. Leadership’s view of the market changed, as it was
perceived safer to invest in Pepsi vs. Coke marketing tactics and sales warfare
to dominate a blockbuster category than product development. Think of the marketing cost in the
Celebrex vs. Vioxx war. Or Viagra
vs. Cialis.
But the market shifted when the FDA decided new drugs had to
be not only efficacious, they had to enhance the standard of care. New drugs actually had to prove better in clinical trials than existing
drugs. And often safer, too.
Hurrumph. Big pharma’s enormous scale advantages in
marketing and communication weren’t enough to assure new product success. It actually took new products. But that meant bigger R&D investments,
perceived as more risky, than the new consumer-oriented pharma companies could
tolerate. Shortly pipelines
thinned, generics emerged and much lower margins ensued.
In some disease areas, this evolution was disastrous for
patients. In antibiotics,
development of new drugs had halted.
Doctors repeatedly prescribed (some say overprescribed) the same antibiotics. As the bacteria evolved, infections
became more difficult to treat.
With no new antibiotics on the market the risk of death from
bacterial infections grew, leading to a national public health crisis. According to the Centers for Disease
Control (CDC) there are over 2 million cases of antibiotic resistant infections
annually. Today just one type of
resistant “staph infection,” known as MRSA, kills more people in the USA than
HIV/AIDs – killing more people every year than polio did at its peak. The most
difficult to treat pathogens (called ESKAPE) are the cause of 66% of hospital
infections.
And that led to an important market shift – via regulation
(Congress?!?!)
With help from the CDC and NIH, the Infectious Diseases
Society of America pushed through the GAIN (Generating Antibiotic Incentives
Now) Act (H.R. 2182.) This gave
creators of new antibiotics the opportunity for new, faster pathways through
clinical trials and review in order to expedite approvals and market launch.
Additionally new product market exclusivity was lengthened an additional 5
years (beyond the normal 5 years) to enhance investor returns.
Which allowed new game changers like Melinta Therapeutics
into the game.
Melinta (formerly Rib-X) was once considered a “biopharma science
company” with Nobel Prize-winning technology, but little hope of commercial
product launch. But now the large
unmet need is far clearer, the playing field has few to no large company
competitors, the commercialization process has been shortened and cheapened,
and the opportunity for extended returns is greater!
Venture firm Vatera Healthcare Partners, with a history of investing in game changers (especially transformational technology,) entered the picture as lead investor. Vatera's founder Michael Jaharis quickly hired Mary Szela, the former head of U.S.
Pharmaceuticals for Abbott (now Abbvie) as CEO. Her resume includes leading the growth of Humira, one of
the world’s largest pharma brands with multi-billion dollar annual sales.
Under her guidance Melinta has taken fast action to work
with the FDA on a much quicker clinical trials pathway of under 18 months for
commercializing delafloxacin. In layman’s
language, early trials of delafloxacin appeared to provide better performance
for a broad spectrum of resistant bacteria in skin infections. And as a one-dose oral (or IV)
application it could be a simpler, high quality solution for gonorrhea.
Melinta continues adding key management resources as it
seeks “breakthrough product” designation under GAIN from the FDA for its RX-04
product. RX-04 is an entirely
different scientific approach to infectious disease control, based on that previously
mentioned proprietary, Nobel-winning ribosome science. It’s a potential product category
game changer that could open the door for a pipeline of follow-on products.
Melinta is using GAIN to do something big pharma, with its
shrinking R&D and commercial staff, is unable to accomplish. Melinta is helping
redefine the rules for approving antibiotics, in order to push through new,
life-saving products.
The best news is that this game change is great for investors.
Those companies who understand the
trend (in this case, the urgent need for new antibiotics) and how the market
has shifted (GAIN,) are putting in place teams to leverage newly invented drugs
working with the FDA. Investment timelines and dollars are looking
far more manageable – and less risky.
Twenty-five years ago pharma looked like a big-company-only
market with little competition and huge returns for a handful of companies. But things changed. Now companies (like Melinta) with new
solutions have the opportunity to move much faster to prove efficacy and safety
– and save lives. They are the
game changers, and the ones more likely to provide not only solutions to the
market but high investor returns.
by Adam Hartung | Oct 18, 2012 | Investing, Trends
For some people this serves as a reminder to invest very, very cautiously. For others it is seen as market hiccups that present buying opportunities. For many it is an admonition to follow the investing advice of Mark Twain (although often attributed to Will Rogers) and pay more attention to the return of your money than the return on your money.
I’ve been investing for 30 years, and like most people I did it pretty badly. For the first 20 years the annual review with my Merrill Lynch stock broker sounded like “Kent, why is it I’m paying fees to you, yet would have done better if I simply bought the Dow Jones Industrial Average?” Across 20 years, almost every year, my “managed” account did more poorly than this collection of big, largely dull, corporations.
A decade ago I dropped my broker, changed my approach, and things have gone much, much better. Simply put I realized that everything I had been taught about investing, including my MBA, assured I would have, at best, returns no better than the overall market. If I used the collective wisdom, I was destined to perform no better than the collective market. Duh. And that is if I remained unemotional and disciplined – which I didn’t assuring I would do worse than the collective market!
Remember, I am not a licensed financial advisor. Below are the insights upon which I based my new investing philosophy. First, the 4 myths that I think steered me wrong, and then the 1 thing that has produced above-average returns, consistently.
Myth 1 – Equities are Risky
Somewhere, somebody came up with a fancy notion that physical things – like buildings – are less risky than financial assets like equities in corporations. Every homeowner in America now knows this is untrue. As does anybody who owns a car, or tractor or even a strip mall or manufacturing plant. Markets shift, and land and buildings – or equipment – can lose value amazingly quickly in a globally competitive world.
The best thing about equities is they can adapt to markets. A smart CEO leading a smart company can change strategy, and investments, overnight. Flexible, adaptable supply chains and distribution channels reduce the risk of ownership, while creating ongoing value. So equities can be the least risky investment option, if you keep yourself flexible and invest in flexible companies.
Hand-in-glove with this is recognizing that the best equities are not steeped in physical assets. Lots of land, buildings and equipment locks-in the P&L costs, even though competitors can obsolete those assets very quickly. And costs remain locked-in even though competition drives down prices. So investing in companies with lots of “hard” assets is riskier than investing in companies where the value lies in intellectual capital and flexibility.
Myth 2 – Invest Only In What You Know
This is profoundly ridiculous. We are humans. There is infinitely more we don’t know than what we do know. If we invest only in what we know we become horrifically non-diversified. And worse, just because we know something does not mean it is able to produce good returns – for anybody!
This was the mantra Warren Buffet used to turn down a chance to invest in Microsoft in 1980. Oops. Not that Berkshire Hathaway didn’t find other investments, but that sure was an easy one Mr. Buffett missed.
To invest smartly I don’t need to know a lot more than the really important trends. I don’t have to know electrical engineering, software engineering or be
an IT professional to understand that the desire to use digital mobile
products, and networks, is growing. I don’t have to be a bio-engineer to know that pharmaceutical solutions are coming very infrequently now, and the future is all in genetic developments and bio-engineered solutions. I don’t have to be a retail expert to know that the market for on-line sales is growing at a double digit rate, while brick-and-mortar retail is becoming a no-growth, dog-eat-margin competitive world (with all those buildings – see Myth 1 again.) I don’t have to be a utility expert to know that nobody wants a nuclear or coal plant nearby, so alternatives will be the long-term answer.
Investing in trends has a much, much higher probability of making good returns than investing in things that are not on major trends. Investing in what we know would leave most people broke; because lots of businesses have more competition than growth. Investing in businesses that are developing major trends puts the wind at your back, and puts time on your side for eventually making high returns.
Oh, and there are a lot fewer companies that invest in trends. So I don’t have to study nearly as many to figure out which have the best investment options, solutions and leadership.
Myth 3 – Dividends Are Important to Valuation
Dividends (or stock buybacks) are the admission of management that they don’t have anything high value into which they can invest, so they are giving me the money. But I am an investor. I don’t need them to give me money, I am giving them money so they will invest it to earn a rate of return higher than I can get on my own. Dividends are the opposite of what I want.
High dividends are required of some investments – like Real Estate Investment Trusts – which must return a percentage of cash flow to investors. But for everyone else, dividends (or stock buybacks) are used to manipulate the stock price in the short-term, at the expense of long-term value creation.
To make better than average returns we should invest in companies that have so many high return investment opportunities (on major trends) that the company really, really needs the cash. We invest in the company, which is a conduit for investing in high-return projects. Not paying a dividend.
Myth 4 – Long Term Investors Do Best By Purchasing an Index (or Giant Portfolio)
Go back to my introductory paragraphs. Saying you do best by doing average isn’t saying much, is it? And, honestly, average hasn’t been that good the last decade. And index investing leaves you completely vulnerable to the kind of “crashes” leading to this article – something every investor would like to avoid. Nobody invests to win sometimes, and lose sometimes. You want to avoid crashes, and make good rates of return.
Investors want winners. And investing in an index means you own total dogs – companies that almost nobody thinks will ever be competitive again – like Sears, HP, GM, Research in Motion (RIM), Sprint, Nokia, etc. You would only do that if you really had no idea what you are doing.
If you are buying an index, perhaps you should reconsider investing in equities altogether, and instead go buy a new car. You aren’t really investing, you are just buying a hodge-podge of stuff that has no relationship to trends or value cration. If you can’t invest in winners, should you be an investor?
1 Truth – Growing Companies Create Value
Not all companies are great. Really. Actually, most are far from great, simply trying to get by, doing what they’ve always done and hoping, somehow, the world comes back around to what it was like when they had high returns. There is no reason to own those companies. Hope is not a good investment theory.
Some companies are magnificent manipulators. They are in so many markets you have no idea what they do, or where they do it, and it is impossible to figure out their markets or growth. They buy and sell businesses, constantly confusing investors (like Kraft and Abbott.) They use money to buy shares trying to manipulate the EPS and P/E multiple. But they don’t grow, because their acquired revenues cost too much when bought, and have insufficient margin.
Most CEOs, especially if they have a background in finance, are experts at this game. Good for executive compensation, but not much good for investors. If the company looks like an acquisition whore, or is in confusing markets, and has little organic growth there is no reason to own it.
Companies that are developing major trends create growth. They generate internal projects which bring them more customers, higher share of wallet with their customers, and create new markets for new revenues where they have few, if any competition. By investing in trends they keep changing the marketplace, and the competition, giving them more opportunities to sell more, and generate higher margins.
Growing companies apply new technologies and new business practices to innovate new solutions solving new needs, and better solve old needs. They don’t compete head-on in gladiator style, lowering margins as they desperately seek share while cutting costs that kills innovation. Instead they ferret out new solutions which give them a unique market proposition, and allow them to produce lots of cash for adding to my cash in order to invest in even more new market opportunities.
If you had used these 4 myths, and 1 truth, what would your investments have been like since the year 2000? Rather than an index, or a manufacturer like GE, you would have bought Apple and Google. Remember, if you want to make money as an investor it’s not about how many equities you own, but rather owning equities that grow.
Growth hides a multitude of sins. If a company has high growth investors don’t care about free lunches for workers, private company planes, free iPhones for employees or even the CEO’s compensation. They aren’t trying to figure out if some acquisition is accretive, or if the desired synergies are findable for lowering cost. None of that matters if there is ample growth.
What an investor should care about, more than anything else, is whether or not there are a slew of new projects in the pipeline to keep fueling the growth. And if those projects are pursuing major trends. Keep your eye on that prize, and you just might avoid any future market crashes while improving your investment returns.
by Adam Hartung | Oct 27, 2011 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Whirlpool, Innovation, Leadership, Web/Tech
There is a big cry for innovation these days. Unfortunately, despite spending a lot of money on it, most innovation simply isn't. And that's why companies don't grow.
The giant consulting firm Booz & Co. just completed its most recent survey on innovation. Like most analysts, they tried using R&D spending as yardstick for measuring innovation. Unfortunately, as a lot of us already knew, there is no correlation:
"There is no statistically significant relationship between financial performance and innovation spending, in terms of either total R&D dollars or R&D as a percentage of revenues. Many companies — notably, Apple — consistently underspend their peers on R&D investments while outperforming them on a broad range of measures of corporate success, such as revenue growth, profit growth, margins, and total shareholder return. Meanwhile, entire industries, such as pharmaceuticals, continue to devote relatively large shares of their resources to innovation, yet end up with much less to show for it than they — and their shareholders — might hope for."
(Uh-hum, did you hear about this Abbott? Pfizer? Readers that missed it might want to glance at last week's blog about Abbott, and why it is a sell after announcing plans to split the company.)
Far too often, companies spend most of their R&D dollars on making their products cheaper, operate better, faster or do more. Clayton Christensen pointed this out some 15 years ago in his groundbreaking book "The Innovator's Dilemma" (HBS Press, 1997). Most R&D, in most industries, and for most companies, is spent trying to sustain an existing technology – not identify or develop a disruptive technology that would have far higher rates of return.
While this is easy to conceptualize, it is much harder to understand. Until we look at a storied company like Kodak – which has received a lot of news this last month.
Kodak invented amateur photography, and was rewarded with decades of profitable revenue growth as its string of cheap cameras, film products and photographic papers changed the way people thought about photographs. Kodak was the world leader in photographic film and paper sales, at great margins, and its value grew exponentially!
Of course, we all know what happened. Amateur photography went digital. No more film, and no more film developing. Even camera sales have disappeared as most folks simply use mobile phones.
But what most people don't know is that Kodak invented digital photography! Really! They were the first to create the technology, and the first to apply it. But they didn't really market it, largely because of fears they would cannibalize their film sales. In an effort to defend & extend their old business, Kodak licensed digital photography patents to camera manufacturers, abandoned R&D in the product line and maintained its focus on its core business. Kodak kept making amateur film better, faster and cheaper – until nobody cared any more.
Of course, Kodak wasn't the first to fall into this trap. Xerox invented desktop publishing but let that market go to Apple, Wintel suppliers and HP printers as it worked diligently trying to defend & extend its copier business. With no click meter on the desktop publishing equipment, Xerox wasn't sure how to make money with it. So they licensed it away.
DEC pretty much created and owned the CAD/CAM business before losing it to AutoCad. Sears created at home shopping, a market now dominated by Amazon. What's your favorite story?
It's a pattern we see a lot. And nowhere worse than at Microsoft.
Do you remember that Microsoft had the Zune player at least as early as the iPod, but didn't bother to develop the technology, or market, letting Apple take the lead in digital music and video devices? Did you remember that the Windows CE smartphone (built by HTC) beat the iPhone to market by years? But Microsoft didn't really develop an app base, didn't really invest in the smartphone technology or market – and let first RIM and later Apple run away with that market as well.
Now, several years too late Microsoft hopes its Nokia partnership will help it capture a piece of that market – despite its still rather apparent lack of an app base or breakthrough advantage.
Microsoft is a textbook example of over-investing in existing technology, in an effort to defend & extend an existing product line, to the point of "over-serving" customer needs. What new extensions do you want from your PC or office software?
Do you remember Clippy? That was the little paper clip that came up in Windows applications to help you do your job better. It annoyed everyone, and was disabled by everyone. A product development that nobody wanted, yet was created and marketed anyway. It didn't sell any additional software products – but it did cost money. That's defend & extend spending.
How much a company spends on innovation doesn't matter, because what's important is what the company spends on real breakthroughs rather than sustaining ideas. Microsoft spends a lot on Windows and Office – it doesn't spend enough on breakthrough innovation for mobile products or games.
And it doesn't spend nearly enough on marketing non-PC innovations. We are already well into the back end of the PC lifecycle. Today more bandwidth is consumed from mobile devices than PC laptops and desktops. Purchase rates of mobile devices are growing at double digits, while companies (and individuals) are curtailing PC purchases. But Microsoft missed the boat because it chose to defend & extend PCs years ago, rather than really try to develop the technology and markets for CE and Zune.
Just look at where Microsoft spends money today. It's hottest innovation is Kinect. But that investment is dwarfed by spending on Skype – intended to extend PC life – and ads promoting the use of PC technologies for families this holiday season.
Unfortunately, there are almost no examples of companies that miss the transition to a new technology thriving. And that's why it is really important to revisit the Kodak chart, and then look at a Microsoft chart.
(Chart 10/27/11)
Do you think Microsoft, after this long period of no value increase, is more likely to go up in value, or more likely to follow Kodak? Unfortunately, there are few companies that make the transition. But there have been thousands that have not. Companies that had very high market share, once made a lot of money, but fell into failure because they invested in better, faster, cheaper rather than innovation.
If you are still holding Kodak, why? If you're still holding Microsoft, Abbott, Kraft, Sara Lee, Sears or Wal-Mart — why?
by Adam Hartung | Oct 19, 2011 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Swamp, Leadership, Lock-in, Science
The giant pharmaceutical company Abbott Labs announced today it was splitting itself. Abbott will sell baby formula, supplements (vitamins,) generic drugs and additional products. The pharmaceutical company, (gee, I thought that's what Abbott was?) yet to be named, will spin out on its own. Chairman and CEO Miles White will continue at the new non-pharma Abbott, and the Newco pharma company will be headed by the company's former COO, being brought back out of retirement for the job.
The big question is, "why?" The CEO gamely has described the businesses as having different profiles, and therefore they should be split. But this is from the fellow that has been the most acquisitive CEO in his industry, and one of the most acquisitive in business, putting this collection together. He spent $10B on acquisitions as recently as 2009, including dropping $6.6B on Belgian drug company Solvay – which will now be espunged from Abbott. Why did he spend all that money if it didn't make sense? And how does this break-up help investors, employees and all us healthcare customers?
Or is this action just confusion, to leave us wondering what's going on in the company – and why it hasn't done much for any constituency the last decade. Except the CEO – who's been the highest paid in the industry, and one of the highest paid in America during his tenure.
Mr. White became CEO in 1998, and Chairman in 1999. Just as the stock peaked. Since then, investors have received almost nothing for holding the stock. Dividend increases have not covered inflation for the last decade, and despite ups and downs the share price is just about where it was back then – $50
Source: Yahoo Finance 10/19/11
Abbott has not increased in value because the company has had almost no organic growth. Growth by acquisition takes a lot of capital, and because purchases have multiple bidders it is really tough to buy them at a price which will earn a high rate of return. All academic studies show that when big companies buy, they always overpay. And that's the only growth Abbott has had – overly expensive acquisitions.
Mr. White hid an inability to grow behind a flurry of ongoing acquisitions (and some divestitures) that made it incredibly difficult to realize that the company itself was actually stagnant. Internally in a growth stall, with no idea how to come out of it. Hoping, again and again, that one of these acquisitions would refire the stalled engines.
This latest action is another round in Abbott's 3 card monte routine. Where's that bloody queen Mr. White keeps promising investors, as he keeps mixing the cards – and turning them over?
Because his acquisitions didn't work he's upping the financial machinations. By splitting the company he will make it impossible for anyone to figure out what all that exasperating activity has been for the last decade! He won't be compared to all those pesky historically weak results, or asked about how he's managing all those big investments, or even held accountable for the tens of billions that he spent at the "old Abbott" when he's asked questions about the "new Abbott."
But re-arranging the deck chairs does not fix the ship, and there's nothing – absolutely nothing – in this action which creates more growth, and higher profits, for Abbott shareholders. Because there's nothing in this that produces new solutions for health care customers.
And look out employees – because now there's 2 CEOs looking for ways to cut costs and create layoffs – like the ones implemented in early 2011! Expect the big knife to come out even harder as both companies struggle to show higher profits, with limited growth prospects.
Along the way, like any good 3 card monte routine, Abbott's CEO has had shills ready to encourage us that the flurry of activity is good for investors. Chronically, they talked about how picking up this business or that was going to grow revenues – almost regardless of the price paid or whether Abbott had any plan for enhancing the acquisition's value. Today, most analysts applauded his actions as "making sense." Of course these were all financial analysts, MBAs like Mr. White, more interested in accounting than actually developing new products. Working mostly for investment banks, they had (and have) a vested interest in promoting the executive's actions – even if it hasn't created any value.
Meanwhile, those betting for the queen to finally show up in this game will just have to keep waiting.
Abbott, like most pharmaceutical companies, has painted itself into a corner. There are more lawyers, accountants, marketers, salespeople and PR folks at Abbott (like all its competitors, by the way) than there are real scientists developing new solutions. Blaming regulators and dysfunctional health care processes, Abbott has insisted on building an enormous hierarchy of people focused on a handful of potential "blockbuster" solutions. It's a bit like the king and his court, filling the castle with those making announcements, arguing about the value of the king's court, sending out messages decrying the barbarians at the gate – while the number of people actually growing corn and creating value keeps dwindling!
Barely 100 years ago most "medicine" was sold based on labels and claims – and practically no science. Quackery dominated the profession. If you wanted something to help your ails, you hoped the local chemist had the skills to mix something up in his apothecary shop, using his mortar and pestle. Often it was best to just take a good shot of opiate (often included in the druggist's powder;) at least you felt a whole lot better even if it didn't cure your illness.
But Alexander Fleming discovered Penicillin (1928), and we realized there was the possibility of massive life improvement from chemistry – specifically what we call pharmacology. Jonas Salk sort of founded the "modern medicine" industry with his polio vaccine in 1955 – eliminating polio epidemics. Science could lead to breakthroughs capable of saving millions of lives! The creation of those injections – and later little pills- changed everything for humanity. And that created the industry.
But now pharmacology is a technology that has mostly run its course. Like all inventions, in the early days the gains were rapid and far, far outweighed the risks. A few might suffer illness, even death, from the drugs – but literally millions were saved. A more than fair trade-off. But after decades, those "easy hits" are gone.
Today we know that every incremental pharmacological innovation is increasingly valuable in a narrower and narrower context. 10% may see huge improvement, 30% some improvement, 30% marginal to no improvement, 20% have negative reactions, and 10% hugely negative reactions. And increasingly, due to science, we know that is because as we trace down the chemical path we are interacting with individuals – and their DNA has a lot to do with how they will react to any drug. Pharmacology isn't nearly as simple as penicillin any more. It's almost one-on-one application to genetic maps.
But Abbott failed (like most of its industry competitors) to evolve. Even though the human genome has been mapped for some 10 years, and even though we now know that future breakthroughs will come from a deeper understanding of gene reactions, there has been precious little research into the new forms of medicine this entails. Abbott remained stuck trying to develop new products on the same path it had taken before, and as the costs rose (almost asymptotically astronomically) the results grew slimmer. Billions were going in, and a lot less discovery was coming out! But the leaders did not change their R&D path.
Today we all hear about patients that have remarkable recoveries from new forms of biologic medicines. We know we are on the cusp of entirely new solutions, that will make the brute force of pharmacology look as medieval as a civil war surgeon's amputation solution to bullet wounds. But Abbott is not there developing those solutions, because it has been trying to defend & extend its old business model with acquisitions like Solvay – and a plethora of financial transactions that hide the abysmal performance of its R&D and new product development.
Mr. White is not a visionary. Never was. He wasn't a research scientist, deep into solving health issues. He wasn't a leader in trying to solve America's health care issues during the last decade. He never exhibited a keen understanding of his customer's needs, trends in the industry, or presience as to future scenarios that would help his markets and thus Abbott's growth.
Mr. White has been an expert in shuffling the cards – moving around the pieces. Misdirecting attention to something new in the middle of the game. Amidst the split announcement today it was easy to overlook that Abbott is setting aside $1.5B for settling charges that it broke regulations by illegally marketing the drug Depakote. Changing investments, changing executives, changing the message – now even changing the company – has been the hallmark of Mr. White's leadership.
Now Abbott joins the list of companies, and CEOs, that when unable to grow their companies lean on misdirection. Kraft and Sara Lee, both Chicago area companies like Abbott, have announced split-ups after failing to create increased shareholder value and laying off thousands of employees. These efforts almost always lead to more problems as organic growth remains stalled, and investors are bamboozled by snake oil claims regarding the future. Hopefully the remaining Abbott investors won't be fooled this time, and they'll find better places for their money than Abbott – or its Newco.
Postscript – the day after publishing this blog 24×7 Wall Street published its annual list of most overpaid CEOs in America. #4 was Miles White, for taking $25.5M in compensation despite a valuation decline of 11.3%!
by Adam Hartung | Oct 5, 2010 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Swamp, Innovation, Leadership, Lock-in, Web/Tech
Summary:
- Research in Motion has launched a tablet, competing with the iPad
- But the Playbook does not have the app base that iPad has developed
- RIM's focus on its "core" IT customer, without spending enough energy focusing on Apple and other competitors, it missed the shift in mobile device user needs
- Now companies, like Abbott, are starting to roll out iPads to field personnel
- RIM's future is in jeopardy as the market shifts away from its products
- You cannot expect your customer to tell you how to develop your product, you have to watch competitors and move quickly to address emerging market needs
Research in Motion has launched a new tablet called Playbook to compete with the Apple iPad. But will it succeed? According to SeekingAlpha.com "Playbook Fails to Boost Research in Motion Price Targets." Most analysts do not think the Playbook has much chance of pushing up the market cap at RIM – and except for home town Canadian analysts the overall expectation for RIM is grim. I certainly agree with the emerging consensus that RIM's future is looking bleak.
Research in Motion was the company that first introduced most of us to smartphones. The Blackberry, often provided by the employer, was the first mobile product that allowed people do email, look at attachments and eventually text – all without a PC. Most executives and field-oriented employees loved them, and over a few years Blackberries became completely common. It looked like RIM had pioneered a new market it would dominate, with its servers squarely ensconced in IT departments and corporate users without option as to what smartphone they would use.
But Apple performed an end-run, getting CEOs to use the iPhone. People increasingly found they needed a personal mobile phone as well as the corporate phone – because they did not want to use the Blackberry for personal use. But they didn't pick Blackberries. Instead they started buying the more stylish, easier to use and loaded with apps iPhone. Apple didn't court the "enterprise" customer – so they weren't even on the radar screen at RIM. But sales were exploding.
Like most companies that focus on their core customers, RIM didn't see the market shift coming. RIM kept talking to the IT department. Much like IBM did in the 1980s when it dropped PCs in favor of supporting mainframes – because their core data center customers said the PC had no future. RIM was carefully listening to its customer – but missing an enormous market shift toward usability and apps. RIM expected its customers to tell them what would be needed in the future – but instead it was the competition that was showing the way.
Now RIM is far, far behind. Where Apple has 300,000 apps, and Android has over 120,000, RIM doesn't even have 10,000. RIM's problem isn't a device issue. RIM has missed the shift to mobile computing and missed understanding the unmet user needs. According to Crain's Chicago Business "Chicago CEOs embrace the iPad." Several critical users – and CEOs are always critical – have already committed to using the iPad and enjoying their news subscriptions and other applications. According to the article, Abbott, which has provided Blackberries to thousands of employees, is now beginning to roll out iPads to field personnel. RIM's Playbook may be a fine piece of hardware, but it offers far too little in the direction of helping people discard PCs as they migrate to cloud architectures and much smaller, easier to use devices such as tablets.
RIM followed the ballyhooed advice of listening to its core customer. But such behavior caused it to miss the shift in its own marketplace toward greater extended use of mobile devices. RIM should have paid more attention to what competitors Apple and Android were doing – and started building out its app environment years ago. RIM should have been first with a tablet – not late. And RIM should have led the movement toward digital publishing – rather than letting Amazon take the lead (Kindle) with Apple close behind. Creating valuable mobility is what the leading company with "motion" in its name should have done. Instead of merely providing the answers to requests from core IT department customers. Now RIM has no chance of catching up with competitors.
